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Modern contract law is designed to achieve a fundamental 
objective, namely, to ensure that voluntary agreements between 
private parties are legally binding. The appropriateness of this 
objective and the assumptions underlying it are rarely questioned. 
Legal scholars, practitioners, and policymakers alike presuppose that 
the binding nature of contracts is a desirable and positive feature of 
our legal system. But are the assumptions underlying the modern 
contract system sound? Do people behave in the way that contract 
law supposes? And are the concepts of voluntary, informed consent 
and freedom from state interference really the hallmarks of the 
modern contract system? This article explores and seeks to answer 
these questions. In so doing, it reveals an overlooked gap between 
theory and practice that calls into doubt the notion that contract law 
has anything to do with freedom and voluntary consent. 
Drawing on leading social science literature, this article seeks to 
make two contributions. First, the article shows that the assumptions 
underlying the modern contract law framework are flawed both 
theoretically and practically. Many contracts are not entered into 
voluntarily by rational actors, and the state regularly interferes. 
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Imbalances of power, not freedom and consent, form the 
cornerstones of the modern system of contract law. Second, the 
article attempts to reveal the way contract law promotes and 
privileges these power imbalances. While the positions staked out in 
this article are admittedly foreign to conventional contract law 
theory, they are far from radical. Instead, they flow naturally from 
well-accepted social science insights, including the work of Legal 
Realists, Critical Legal Studies scholars, relational contract 
theorists, and, more recently, the field of behavioral law and 
economics. What is striking is not that the positions advanced here 
depart from conventional belief, but that the lessons from leading 
social science research have had, to date, so little impact on contract 
doctrine. This article seeks to change that. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Modem contract law is crafted to achieve a fundamental 
objective-to ensure that voluntary agreements between private 
parties are legally binding. 1 Several assumptions about how people 
behave serve to justify this objective. Modem contract law assumes 
that contractual obligations are private transactions, voluntarily 
undertaken by informed, rational actors, in a market mostly free of 
state interference.2 Once a contract is properly formed, parties are 
required to comply with the agreed-upon obligations. Compliance is 
ensured through state power,3 even if in hindsight one party has made 
a "bad bargain.,,4 
The appropriateness of this objective (to create binding legal 
obligations) and the assumptions underlying it are rarely questioned. 
Legal scholars, practitioners, and policymakers alike presuppose, 
without serious analysis, that the binding nature of contracts is a 
desirable and positive feature of our legal system.5 Indeed, what 
could be wrong in requiring parties to keep their promises? That the 
law holds people to their promises is perceived as fair because 
contract law purports to reduce unequal bargaining power and other 
inequities to make agreements a product of voluntary, informed 
consent.6 But are the assumptions underlying the modem contract 
system sound? Do people behave in the way that contract law 
supposes? And are the concepts of voluntary, informed consent and 
freedom from state interference really the hallmarks of the modem 
contract system? This article explores and seeks to answer these 
questions. In so doing, it reveals an overlooked gap between theory 
and practice that calls into doubt the notion that contract law has 
anything to do with freedom and voluntary consent. 
Drawing on leading social science literature, this article seeks to 
make two contributions. First, the article shows that the assumptions 
underlying the modem contract law framework are flawed both 
theoretically and practically. 7 Many contracts are not entered into 
voluntarily by rational actors, and the state regularly interferes. 
l. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 cmt. a, c, g (1981); see also infra Part 
LA. 
2. See infra text accompanying notes 55-65 (discussing the listed assumptions). 
3. See infra Part ILA. 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 331-32 (discussing bad bargains specifically). 
5. See generally Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Formation and the Entrenchment of Power, 
41 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 175, 199-204 (2009); infra notes 55-64 and accompanying text 
(discussing suggested, positive aspects of modern contract law). 
6. See infra Part LA; Hart, supra note 5, at 175-82. 
7. See infra Part ILA. 
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Imbalances of power, not freedom and consent, form the cornerstones 
of the modem system of contract law.8 Second, the article attempts 
to reveal the way contract law promotes and privileges these power 
imbalances.9 While present remedial mechanisms focused on 
disclosure are commonly believed to mitigate power inequities, in 
reality those mechanisms do the opposite. Instead, the article shows 
that unequal bargaining power is effectively institutionalized in the 
modern contract law system, and demonstrates how that system 
surreptitiously promotes misuse and abuse of power. IO 
In advancing these positions, the article breaks sharply from the 
current literature. For example, while many contract-law scholars 
extol the virtue of disclosure statutes as a way to address unequal 
bargaining power, II the article argues that those disclosure 
requirements are ineffective at best, and, at worst, exacerbate the 
problem. 12 
While the positions staked out in this article are admittedly foreign 
to conventional contract law theory, they are far from radical. 
Instead, they flow naturally from well-accepted social science 
insights, including the work of Legal Realists, Critical Legal Studies 
scholars, relational contract theorists, and, more recently, the field of 
behavioral law and economics. 13 What is striking is not that the 
positions advanced here depart from conventional belief, but that the 
lessons from leading social science research have had, to date, so 
little impact on contract doctrine. This article seeks to change that. 
With this in mind, the article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, the 
article focuses on how the modern contract law system 14 legitimizes 
itself through the binding nature of agreements. The article also 
explores the fundamental assumptions that underlie contract law and 
the manner in which disclosure statutes embrace those underlying 
assumptions. In Part II, the article demonstrates how those 
8. See irifra Part III. 
9. See infra Part III. 
10. See irifra Part III.B. 
11. See infra text accompanying notes 111-14 (discussing purposes of disclosure 
statutes). 
12. See irifra Part III.B. 
13. See infra Part II.A. 
14. The terms "modem contract law system" and "modern contract law" are used 
interchangeably throughout the article. In using either term, I am referring to the rules 
of contract law, its animating norm(s), and the assumptions that underlie those rules. 
See infra text accompanying notes 53--65 (discussing the underlying assumptions). 
The context in the article should make it clear whether the rules, norm(s), or 
assumptions are being discussed. 
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assumptions are flawed, both in theory and in practice. In so doing, 
Part II exposes the extent to which state power is ever present in the 
modem contract law system. Finally, in Part III, the article shows 
how unequal bargaining power is institutionalized and how power is 
concealed within the modern contract law system to the detriment of 
parties with less bargaining power. The article demonstrates how, 
contrary to conventional wisdom, disclosure statutes frustrate, rather 
than aid, in reducing the negative effects of bargaining power 
inequities. Part III also reveals how modem contract law gives 
license to parties with more bargaining power, if they so choose,15 to 
impose "bad bargains" on other contracting partners with impunity. 
The article concludes on a provocative note. Once the inequities 
girding the modem contract law system are unmasked, they suggest 
that we cannot continue to ignore them, but instead must more 
meaningfully discuss what, if anything, can or should be done. 
A final point before proceeding: The questions raised and legal 
doctrines critiqued in this article are not simply matters of high-
minded theory-they have pragmatic and real life implications. The 
recent subprime-mortgage debacle is illustrative of how the modem 
contract law system enforces "bad bargains" and where bargaining 
power inequities lead to bad results. To concretely illustrate the 
arguments made, this article will rely on the following hypothetical 
involving a subprime home mortgage loan,16 one in which disclosure 
statutes are implicated. The specific statutes include the Truth in 
Lending Act (TILA)17 and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
(RESPA).18 
15. Professor Daniel Bamhizer argues that the fact that "one side has great visible, real 
power in the bargaining process may just as easily permit that party to make 
concessions." Daniel D. Bamhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. 
REv. 139, 177 (2005) [hereinafter Barnhizer, Inequality]. While this is correct, the 
significant thing to keep in mind is that it is still a choice whether to impose a bad 
bargain or not and the only party with the capacity to exercise that choice is the party 
with superior bargaining power. 
16. An accepted definition of a "subprime loan" is one with an annual percentage rate 
(APR) that is three or more points higher than the treasury rate for a security of the 
same maturity. Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime 
Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1073, 1088 (2009). 
17. IS U.S.C. §§ 1601-1615, 1631-1649, 1661, 1667(f) (2000 & Supp. III 2004) 
(implemented by the Federal Reserve Board via Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 
(2005)). 
18. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 12 U.S.c. §§ 2601-2617 (2006) 
(implemented by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, 24 C.F.R. pts. 
3500, 3800 (2008)). 
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The lender in the hypothetical is CitiMortgage. CitiMortgage was 
chosen because it is a mortgage companyl9 and a subsidiary of 
Citigroup, Inc./o it was also one of the biggest subprime mortgage 
lenders in the country.21 The borrower is Mary Smith, a 32-year-old, 
single, African-American woman. Research and studies show that 
subprime loans were predominantly made to younger, single or 
divorced women of color living in minority neighborhoods. 22 
19. Mortgage companies, as opposed to depository institutions, like a bank, were 
responsible for originating the bulk of subprime loans. Bar-Gill, supra note 16, at 
1090. 
20. This information was taken from the Citi website: CITI, 
http://www.citigroup.comlciti/businessJbrands.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 20 II). 
21. In 2006, CitiMortgage was the fifth top subprime lender, based on market share. See 
IVY L. ZELMAN ET AL., CREDIT SUISSE, MORTGAGE LIQUIDITY DU JOUR: 
UNDERESTIMATED No MORE 22 exhibit 14 (2007), available at 
http://www.recharts.comlreports/CSHB031207/CSHB031207.html(listing the market 
shares of the top subprime lenders in 2006 as follows: Wells Fargo 13.0%, HSBC 
Finance S.3%, New Century S.I %, Countl)'Wide Financial 6.3%, CitiMortgage 5.9%, 
WMC Mortgage 5.2%, Fremont Investment 5.0%, Ameriquest 4.6%, Option One 
4.5%, First Franklin 4.3%, Washington Mutual 4.2%, Residential Funding 3.4%, 
Aegis Mortgage 2.7%, American General 2.4%, Accredited Lenders 2.3%). The 
report also noted that the top fifteen lenders captured SO.5% of the market. Jd. 
22. See ALLEN J. FISHBEIN & PATRICK WOODALL, CONSUMER FED'N OF AMERICA, 
WOMEN ARE PRIME TARGETS FOR SUBPRIME LENDING: WOMEN ARE 
DISPROPORTIONATELY REPRESENTED IN HIGH-COST MORTGAGE MARKET 1-4, 6-11, 
15 (2006), available at http://www.consumerfed.orgipdfs/ 
WomenPrimeTargetsStudyl20606.pdf (finding that women, particularly African-
American and Latino women, were more likely to receive subprime mortgages than 
men); CAPITAL AREA ASSET BUILDERS ET AL., SUBPRIME MORTGAGE LENDING IN THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: A STUDY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, SECURITIES 
AND BANKING 1, 7, 10, 14-15 (200S), available at 
http://www.trfund.comlresource/downloads/policypubs/Subprime_Lending_ 
Study _6_20_ OS _ DC.pdf (finding that subprime loans were disproportionately made to 
low income, African-American borrowers); CONSUMERS UNION SWRO, WOMEN IN 
THE SUBPRIME MARKET 1-2 (2002), available at http://www.consumersunion. 
orgipdflwomen-sub.pdf(data from Texas); IRA GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE REINVESTMENT 
FUND, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE FILINGS IN MARYLAND: A STUDY BY THE 
REINVESTMENT FUND FOR THE BALTIMORE HOMEOWNERSHIP PRESERVATION 
COALITION 6, 26, 34 (200S), available at http://www.trfund.comlresource 
/downloads/policypubs/MarylandForeclosure.pdf (finding that African-Americans 
living in predominantly African-American neighborhoods received a higher 
percentage of sUbprime loans than other racial categories, and that most loans in 
foreclosure were obtained for home purchases rather than refinances); Manny 
Fernandez, Study Finds Disparities in Mortgages by Race, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15,2007, 
http;//www.nytimes.coml200711 0/15/nyregionlI5subprime.html? _ r= I (citing a study 
conducted by New York University's Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban 
Policy, which indicated that "[h lome buyers in predominantly black and Hispanic 
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African-American women were disproportionately represented 
among this demographic.23 
In 2006, CitiMortgage sold Ms. Smith a subprime loan to purchase 
a single-family residence24 in a predominantly minority neighborhood 
in exchange for a mortgage on the house purchased. CitiMortgage 
sold Ms. Smith this loan even though she did not actually qualify for 
it.25 Some of the terms included in the loan were a high prepayment 
penalty provision/6 very high origination27 and post-origination 
neighborhoods in New York City were more likely to get their mortgages last year 
from a subprime lender than home buyers in white neighborhoods with similar income 
levels"). 
23. FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 22, at I (finding that women, particularly African-
American and Latino women, were more likely to receive subprime mortgages than 
men); accord CONSUMERS UNION SWRO, supra note 22, at 1-4 (data from Texas). 
24. In 2006, "42.4 percent of first-lien subprime loans were purchase loans." Bar-Gill, 
supra note 16, at 1089. 
25. Qualifying for a loan is the process by which a person applies for a loan and the 
lender determines the likelihood that the borrower will be able to repay the loan 
according to its terms. Nathaniel R. Hull, Comment, Crossing the Line: Prime, 
Subprime, and Predatory Lending, 61 ME. L. REV. 287, 288 (2009). Lenders 
generally use several established criteria to determine whether a borrower qualifies for 
a home mortgage loan: the borrower's credit score-usually a FICO score higher than 
660; documentation of income, debt, employment, and assets (including financial 
resources and other property or collateral); and "a loan amount less than the maximum 
size loan that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are allowed to purchase." Jd. at 292 & 
nn.33-34; see also Do You QualifY for a Mortgage Loan?, INCHARGE DEBT 
SOLUTIONS, http://www . incharge.orglmoney -101 Ibuying-a-home/do-you-qualify-for-
a-mortgage-Ioan (last visited Nov. 26, 2011). If a borrower satisfies the criteria, she 
qualifies for a prime mortgage, which is a mortgage at the best interest rate then 
available. If she does not meet the criteria, then she generally only qualifies for a 
subprime mortgage, which is a mortgage at a higher interest rate. Hull, supra at 292; 
see also supra note 16 (defining subprime loan). To say that Mary Smith did not 
qualify for the subprime mortgage loan she was sold by CitiMortgage, therefore, 
means not only that she did not satisfy one or more of the lending criteria, but also 
that she was unlikely to be able to repay the loan according to its terms. 
26. A common feature of subprime loans was a steep prepayment penalty term. Estimates 
suggest that between 64% and 98% of subprime loans included a prepayment penalty. 
Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of 
Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REv. 707, 763 (2006); see also Bar-Gill, supra 
note 16, at 1101 (putting the number at 70%). Significantly, the steep prepayment 
penalty provisions made it prohibitively expensive for many borrowers to refinance 
out of their original loans at all, let alone prior to the upward adjustment of their 
adjustable rate mortgages. See CAPITAL AREA ASSET BUILDERS ET AL., supra note 22, 
at 2; cf Catherine M. Brennan, Unintended Consequences: Investor Fallout from the 
Mortgage Crisis, 28 No. 12 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'y REP. I (Dec. 2009); 
Bar-Gill, supra note 16, at 1102 ("Prepayment penalties make it more difficult for 
borrowers to evade the escalating payments."). To put prepayment penalties into 
some perspective, Bar-Gill writes: 
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fees,28 which totaled 20% of the loan amount/9 and a 2/28 adjustable-
rate mortgage (ARM).30 CitiMortgage properly disclosed to Ms. 
Smith all of the information required by TILA and RESP A, the 
relevant consumer protection statutes. CitiMortgage did not, 
however, disclose to Ms. Smith that she did not qualify for the loan. 
Two years later, Ms. Smith defaulted on her loan. 
I. BINDING CONTRACTS 
The starting point of the analysis is the way in which the modem 
contract law system legitimizes itself through the binding nature of 
agreements. "Binding" means two different but related things31-
first, "binding" means that the contract is valid as between the parties 
(because it satisfies contract law's formation requirements), and 
second, it means that the rights and obligations set forth in that 
contract will be enforced by the state on behalf of one of the parties 
The penalty amount is usually expressed as a percentage of the 
outstanding balance on the loan, up to 5 percent, or as the sum of 
a specified number of months, commonly six months, worth of 
interest payments. This is a significant amount. For example, a 3 
percent penalty on a $200,000 balance amounts to $6,000. 
Id. at 1101 (footnote omitted). 
27. Id. at 1077 ("[O]rigination fees [include] a credit check fee, an appraisal fee, a flood 
certification fee, a tax certification fee, an escrow analysis fee, an underwriting 
analysis fee, a document preparation fee and separate fees for sending emails, faxes 
and courier mail .... "); Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 
U. PA. L. REv. 1, 39 (2008) ("The Wall Street Journal points to one possibility: 
mortgage brokers received 27% higher fees for originating subprime mortgages than 
for originating conforming loans."). 
28. Bar-Gill, supra note 16, at 1077 (,,[P]ost-origination fees [include] late fees, 
foreclosure fees, ... and dispute-resolution or arbitration fees."). 
29. Id. ("[Origination and post-origination] fees can add up to thousands of dollars, or up 
to 20 percent of the loan amount."). According to Professor Lauren Willis, "[w]hen 
financed into the loan, origination fees and ancillary products form the basis for 
additional interest charges over the life of the loan." Willis, supra note 26, at 725. 
30. A 2/28 adjustable rate mortgage is one that has a fixed interest rate for the first two 
years of the loan and then an adjustable interest rate for the remaining twenty-eight 
years of the loan. Mortgage Reference Library: 2128 Adjustable Rate Mortgage, 
BROKER OUTPOST, http://www.brokeroutpost.comlreference/27353.htrn (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2011); see also Bar-Gill, supra note 16, at 1098 ("According to the FRB, 
approximately three-fourths of originations in securitized subprime 'pools' from 2003 
to 2007 were ARMs or hybrids with two- or three-year 'teaser' rates followed by 
substantial increases in the rate and payment (so-called '2-28' and '3-27' 
mortgages). "). 
31. See infra Part II.A. See generally Hart, supra note 5, at 204-16 (articulating in detail 
both aspects of "being bound" to a contract). 
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over the objection of the other, now "resisting party.,,32 Modem 
contract law relies on several fundamental assumptions to justify 
binding people to their contracts and the modem system's reliance on 
disclosure statutes. If these assumptions are correct, then it is 
perfectly acceptable to make contracts binding33 and to rely on 
disclosure statutes as a remedial mechanism. 
A. The Modern Contract Law System 
Contract law allegedly shifted in the 1930s34 from the classical to 
the modem system.35 Modem contract law is different from classical 
32. This latter statement in the text is true because, in reality, contract law is primarily 
concerned with holding a "resisting party," that is, a party that no longer wants to be 
bound by the contract, to the contract. If both parties were performing and had no 
objections to the other's performance, there would be no legal problem for contract 
law to be concerned with. Conversely, if both parties decided they wanted to walk 
away from the contract, there is again no legal problem presented, because neither 
party would be complaining about the other's performance or lack thereof. Hence, 
contract law is especially concerned with enforcing a contract against one of the 
parties, specifically, the party who no longer wants to be bound by it. See William 
Joseph Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to 
Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REv. 975, 987 n.14 (1982) ("Enforcement of contracts does not 
merely ratify the results of individual will; it chooses whose will to enforce by 
overriding the will of the one who breached the contract."); Morris R. Cohen, The 
Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553,562 (1933) [hereinafter Cohen, Contract] 
("[I]n enforcing contracts, the government does not merely allow two individuals to 
do what they have found pleasant in their eyes. Enforcement, in fact, puts the 
machinery of the law in the service of one party against the other. "). 
33. Even the party seeking enforcement would need to be "bound" to the contract, 
through formation and enforcement, to assert its claims under it. Therefore, contracts 
must be binding on both parties. 
34. This version of the evolution of contract law is not without its critics. See, e.g., Roy 
KREITNER, CALCULATING PROMISES: THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN AMERICAN 
CONTRACT DOCTRINE 7 (2007) (commenting that the tendency to read the history of 
contract law as an evolutionary process in which "contract was always about 
individuals creating their own obligations" is "ahistorical and thus in some sense a 
distortion"); GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 3--4 (1974). 
35. The classical legal period lasted roughly seventy years, from 1860 to the 1930s. See 
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, at xi (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter 
LEGAL REALISM]; Jay M. Feinman, Un-Making Law: The Classical Revival in the 
Common Law, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REv. I, 3 (2004) [hereinafter Feinman, Un-Making] 
(noting that classical legal thought was dominant from 1870 to 1920); Joseph William 
Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 465, 478 (1988) [hereinafter Singer, 
Realism] (setting the time period of classical legal thought as 1860-1940). But see 
Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF 
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 23,28 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) [hereinafter 
Mensch, History] (setting the time period as 1885-1935). The shift to modern 
contract law lasted approximately sixty years, from the 1930s through the 
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contract law in many ways. For example, modem contract law relies 
on standards rather than rigid, technical rules; 36 makes the context in 
which a contract was formed matter in a couple of important 
respects;37 and gives expanded recognition to several "contract 
policing,,3& doctrines39 and to reliance and restitution as alternatives to 
a traditional contract.40 
Unlike classical contract, modern contract law also acknowledges 
that markets are not perfect41 and, in fact, contain imperfections, 
primarily in the form of information asymmetries and bargaining 
1990s. Feinman, Un-Making, supra at 11-14; Ralph James Mooney, The New 
Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L. REv. 113 I, 1133 (1995) [hereinafter 
Mooney, New Conceptualism]. 
36. E. Allan Farnsworth, Some Prefatory Remarks: From Rules to Standards, 67 
CORNELL L. REv. 634, 634 (1982) [hereinafter Farnsworth, Prefatory Remarb]; Jay 
M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1287 
(1990) [hereinafter Feinman, Theory]; Charles L. Knapp, An Offer You Can't Revoke, 
2004 WIS. L. REv. 309,318 (2004) [hereinafter Knapp, Offer]; Richard E. Speidel, 
Afterword: The Shifting Domain of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 254, 260 (1995) 
[hereinafter Speidel, Domain]. 
37. Knapp, Offer, supra note 36, at 317; see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence 
of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1743, 1749, 1756-60 (2000) [hereinafter 
Eisenberg, Dynamic] (providing interpretation for the agreed-to contract terms); 
Feinman, Theory, supra note 36, at 1287 (supplying additional terms); Speidel, 
Domain, supra note 36, at 260-61 (supplying additional terms). 
38. "Contract policing" doctrines are doctrines used by courts to police contracts against, 
among other things, unfairness or bargaining misbehavior in the formation process 
and inequality in the resulting exchange. See generally 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 
CONTRACTS §§ 4.1, 4.9 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the policing of contractual 
agreements). 
39. Specifically, modem contract law gives expanded recognition to llnconscionability, 
dllress in the form of economic duress, and misrepresentation. See Hart, supra note 5, 
at 178 n.7. The traditional contract policing doctrines inclllde minority, mental 
incapacity, duress, undue influence, and fraud. Id. Modem contract law continues to 
recognize them as well. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 14 
(minority), 15 (mental illness or defect), 175 (duress), 177 (undue influence) (1981). 
40. Feinman, Theory, supra note 36, at 1288; Robert Hillman, The Crisis in Modern 
Contract Theory, 67 TEX. L. REv. 103, 103-04 (1988) [hereinafter Hillman, Crisis]; 
Knapp, Offer, supra note 36, at 318; Blake D. Morant, The Teachings of Dr. Martin 
Luther King. Jr. and Contract Theory: An Intriguing Comparison, 50 ALA. L. REv. 
63,97 (1998) [hereinafter Morant, MLKj; Speidel, Domain, supra note 36, at 260-61. 
A traditional contract is one formed by mutual assent and consideration. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981). 
41. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REv. 741, 
750 (1982) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Bargain] ("[M]any contracts are made in markets 
that are highly imperfect."). 
12 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 41 
inequalities.42 Modem contract law assumes, however, that such 
problems are correctable with discrete and relatively easy-to-
implement solutions.43 
Many of the changes implemented by modem contract law were 
an attempt to give effect to norms of fairness and cooperation as 
supplements to,44 but not replacements of, the classical norms of 
individual autonomy and liberty.45 All of these changes remain in 
place today, despite the alleged shift from modem contract to neo-
classical contract law in the 1990s.46 For internal consistency and to 
avoid confusion in nomenclature, however, the article will refer to the 
contract law system that is being critiqued as "modem" contract law. 
While there are clearly differences between classical and modem 
contract law, the two systems are fundamentally the same. This is 
true because modem contract law continues to adhere to most of the 
42. Morant, MLK, supra note 40, at 96 ("Anomalies of the marketplace included 
opportunism, the lack of perfect information, and bargaining inequity.") (internal 
citations omitted); cf Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in 
Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal 
Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563, 583 (1982) (recognizing the development of 
the decision maker to undertake a careful analysis in terms of the distributive 
objective and its consistency with freedom of contract); Mensch, History, supra note 
35, at 47 (discussing the view that courts should assign rights where they are most 
valuable, mimicking the real-world, imperfect market). 
43. See infra Part LB (discussing disclosure statutes). 
44. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REv. 
1107, 1111-12 (1984) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Responsive]; Feinman, Theory, supra 
note 36, at 1287-88; Knapp, Offer, supra note 36, at 318; Blake D. Morant, The 
Relevance of Race and Disparity in Discussions of Contract Law, 31 NEW ENG. L. 
REv. 889,902-03 (1997) [hereinafter Morant, Race]. 
45. Peter Gabel & Jay Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A 
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 497,497 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) ("The principle of 
personal autonomy underlying freedom of contract has been supplemented by modem 
principles of cooperation and fairness .... "); Morant, MLK, supra note 40, at 97 
("While clinging to the notion of contractual freedom and bargaining autonomy, 
neoclassicists appreciated some of the realities of bargaining differences."). 
46. See Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract 
Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 761, 773 (2002) [hereinafter, Knapp, Private]; Mooney, 
New Conceptualism, supra note 35, at 1133-34. In fact, the claims made in this 
article are probably more compelling as applied to neo-classical contract law, given 
that this system resurrects much of the classical formalism rejected by modem 
contract. See Feinman, Un-Making, supra note 35, at 16 ("Under the classical revival, 
formality reigns at two levels. First, the contract doctrine itself becomes more formal; 
ostensibly clear, rigid rules are favored over flexible standards. Second, the substance 
of the rules favors formality in contracting practices."). But see KREITNER, supra note 
34, at 7 (acknowledging that this version of contract history is contested). 
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classical system's underlying assumptions, and it left the core of 
classical contract law, which is formation, completely intact. 
To begin with, the modem contract law system,47 like the classical 
system, still presupposes that an individual acts rationally48 in a 
largely unregulated market.49 Moreover, individual liability is still 
premised on voluntary agreement. 50 Modem contract law also retains 
the public-private distinction5l upon which much of classical legal 
thought was based. 52 As a result, the paradigm transaction under 
modem contract law, as under classical contract law, is the private 
law transaction,53 one that is framed by all of the following well-
established54 classical and now modem assumptions: 55 
47. See Feinman, Theory, supra note 36, at 1310. 
48. See Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 737, 
739-40, 743 (2000) [hereinafter Feinman, Relational]. 
49. See Jay M. Feinman, Book Review, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 287, 293 (2005) [hereinafter 
Feinman, Book Review]. 
50. See Feinman, Theory, supra note 36, at 1287. 
51. Classical legal thought was structured around several dichotomies, the most important 
of which was the public-private distinction. See Feinman, Theory, supra note 36, at 
1286. Within the private law sphere of the public-private dichotomy, individuals 
exercised rights and were free to agree on whatever contract terms they wanted. See 
P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 403 (1979); Singer, 
Realism, supra note 35, at 478-79. The state ostensibly played no role in regulating 
the substantive terms of these private relations. See LEGAL REALISM, supra note 35, at 
99; Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 479. In the public sphere of government 
regulation, public officials exercised state power, and all state-imposed obligations, 
like quasi-contracts, torts, and real property, were relegated to this sphere. See Singer, 
Realism, supra note 35, at 478, 480-81. 
52. Mensch, History, supra note 35, at 39 ("[M]odem American legal thought continues 
to be premised on the distinction between private law and public law. Private law is 
still assumed to be about private actors with private rights, making private 
choices .... "). 
53. Jay M. Feinman, Contract After the Fall, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1537, 1538 (1987) 
(reviewing HUGH COLLINS, THE LAW OF CONTRACT (\986)) [hereinafter Feinman, 
Fall]; Mensch, History, supra note 35, at 39, 41. 
54. See, e.g., Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New 
Formalism, 75 Mo. L. REV. 493, 495-96 (2010) ("It is, therefore, now an accepted 
tenet of contract law that '[f]reedom of contract prevails in an arm's-length 
transaction between sophisticated parties ... and in the absence of countervailing 
public policy concerns there is no reason to relieve them of the consequences of their 
bargain. "') (alteration in original) (quoting Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, 
Dixon & Co., 660 N.E.2d 415, 421 (N.Y. 1995)). 
55. All ofthe assumptions listed in the text were adopted by the classical legal system and 
retained by modem contract law. See Hart, supra note 5, at 189, 195-98. 
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(1) A contract is a private transaction between private 
parties.56 
(2) Parties bargain at arm's length, meaning they are most 
likely strangers to one another. 57 
(3) Individuals are rational actors in the marketplace.58 
(4) Contracts result from voluntary and informed choice.59 
56. A TlY AH, supra note 51, at 408 ("The autonomy of the free choice of private parties to 
make their own contracts on their own terms was the central feature of classical 
contract law."); Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From 
Feminist Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 
U. PA. L. REV. 1235, 1261 (1998) ("Conventional contract logic views contract law as 
a realm of purely private ordering in which individuals are free to choose the structure 
of their relationships without interference. In this view, law does not judge the 
formation, performance, or breach of a contract on the basis of external juristic values; 
law acts only as a surrogate for the values created by the parties themselves."); see 
also Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 
997, 1014 (1985) ("[O]ur principal vision of contract law is still one of a neutral 
facilitator of private volition. We understand that contract law is concerned at the 
periphery with the imposition of social duties. . .. But we conceive the central arena 
to be an unproblematic enforcement of obligations voluntarily undertaken. . . . 
Although we concede that the law of contract is the result of public decisions about 
what agreements to enforce, we insist that the overarching public decision is to respect 
and enforce private intention."). 
57. See A T1Y AH, supra note 51, at 402--03 ("The model of contract theory which 
implicitly underlay the classical law of contract ... was thus the model of the market. 
Essentially this model is based on the following principal features. First, the parties 
deal with each other 'at arm's length' ... ; this carries the notion that each relies on 
his own skill and judgment, and that neither owes any fiduciary obligation to the 
other."); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There Is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 Nw. 
U. L. REV. 805, 808 (2000) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Relational] ("[C]lassical contract 
law was implicitly based on a paradigm of bargains made between strangers 
transacting in a perfect market."). 
58. Eisenberg, Relational, supra note 57, at 808 ("[C]lassical contract law was based on a 
rational-actor model of psychology, under which actors who make decisions in the 
face of uncertainty rationally maximize their subjective expected utility, with all 
future benefits and costs discounted to present value. In particular, the rules of 
classical contract law were implicitly based on the assumptions that actors are fully 
knowledgeable, know the law, and act rationally to further their economic self-
interest."); Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 
829, 832 (1983) [hereinafter Feinman, Critical] (individuals acted in their own self-
interest); see also ATIYAH, supra note 51, at 403. 
59. Hadfield, supra note 56, at 1247 (1998) ("Contract law proceeds from the premise 
that obligation is established by the existence of voluntary and informed choice to 
enter into a contract. "); see also ATIY AH, supra note 51, at 403 ("[The fourth principle 
of classical contract law is that] the deal is finally struck when the parties agree, or 
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(5) Contract law is the law of the market.60 Markets are 
neutral and impartial, primarily self-regulating, and 
largely outside of state control, but they do contain 
imperfections in the form of information asymmetries 
and bargaining inequalities.61 Such imperfections, 
however, can be fixed with minimal interference from 
the state, thereby preserving the integrity of the 
market. 62 
(6) The state's role is neutral and minima1.63 
15 
In addition, and significantly, modem and classical contract law 
are fundamentally the same because modern contract law left the core 
indicate their agreement. . .. The agreement must be made 'freely' and 'without 
pressure' but these concepts are very narrowly interpreted, for they must not conflict 
with the rule of the market place .... "); Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 479 
(arguing that the "[c]lassical theorists considered three principles to be central to a 
free contract systern[,l" one of which was the principle that a party could not be 
forced to contract against her will). 
60. See A TIY AH, supra note 51, at 402 ("The emphasis on contract law as the law of the 
market was, in England at least, well established by 1870, although in America it may 
have been a later development."); Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 477-82. See 
generally AMy DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT 2, 13, 59 (1998) 
(establishing that market theory of contract is a post-emancipation phenomenon); 
Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. 
L. REv. 917,936-52 (1974). 
61. Morant, MLK, supra note 40, at 95 ("Anomalies of the marketplace included 
opportunism, the lack of perfect information, and bargaining inequity.") (footnotes 
omitted). 
62. According to Jay Feinman, there is an "ideology of the market" still regnant in legal 
education, politics, government, and social thought generally. He writes: 
This ideology presents the market as the primary form of social 
organization, as an empirical fact and a desirable state of affairs. 
The market effectively enables individuals to achieve their life 
projects while maximizing social welfare as a whole. It arises and 
proceeds through a spontaneous order, obviating centralized 
planning or significant government intervention. All of these 
virtues require no more than modest correction at the margins, and 
the job of the law is to maintain the conditions of the market, 
notably through establishing ground rules of property and 
contract, providing legal institutions and mechanisms to facilitate 
market transactions, and maintaining social order. 
Feinman, Book Review, supra note 49, at 293. 
63. The Critique of the Public/Private Distinction, in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra 
note 35, at 98,99; see also Dalton, supra note 56, at 1012-13; Singer, Realism, supra 
note 35, at 479-80, 481. 
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of classical contract law, which is fonnation, completely intact. 64 
Mutual assent and consideration remain the only two elements 
necessary to fonn a contract. 65 Indeed, modem contract law actually 
strengthens the core (fonnation) because it makes it easier to fonn a 
contract. 66 Specifically, modem contract law makes it particularly 
easy to establish mutual assent,67 and the existence and adequacy of 
consideration is seldom, if ever, questioned in a market-based 
transaction.68 
Thus, modem contract law, like classical contract before it, creates 
a "presumption of contract validity,,69 upon fonnation of a traditional 
contract via mutual assent and consideration. 70 In other words, upon 
fonnation, the law will presume that a valid contract exists.71 
Significantly, the presumption of contract validity is very difficult to 
rebut under both the classical and modem systems, because of what I 
have called elsewhere the "process problem.,,72 Briefly, the process 
problem makes rebutting the presumption of contract validity 
especially difficult because (1) the burden of proving that a contract 
is unenforceable73 for any reason is on the party challenging the 
contract or defending against a breach of contract claim; 74 (2) all of 
64. See generally Hart, supra note 5, at Part III.B. 
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981) ("[T]he formation of a 
contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the 
exchange and a consideration."); Morant, MLK, supra note 40, at 93 ("A basic tenet of 
traditional, classic contract theory requires that parties steadfastly obey the rules of 
bargain formation in order to have binding agreements. Those whose agreements 
manifest mutual assent and contain consideration may expect the enforcement of their 
resultant agreements, barring some impediment.") (footnotes omitted). 
66. See Hart, supra note 5, at Part IILB.3. 
67. Id. at 202-10. 
68. See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 38, § 2.2, at 48; Hart, supra note 5, at 205. In fact, 
consideration is often irrelevant in a business context because contract law will find a 
binding contract even in the absence of it. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-205 (2003) (creating 
an option contract without requiring consideration); U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (2003) 
(making a modification under Article 2 binding without consideration); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (a), (c) (1981) (containing exceptions to the pre-
existing duty rule that validate modifications obtained without consideration). 
69. See generally Hart, supra note 5, at Part IILB.4. 
70. A traditional contract is one formed via mutual assent and consideration. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981). 
71. Hart, supra note 5, at 206. 
72. See id. at 210-15. 
73. "Unenforceable," as used here, refers to anything that gets someone out of the 
contract, whether by rescission, discharge of performance obligation, unenforceability 
of the contract, etc. 
74. Hart, supra note 5, at 207, 212-15; see also Stone v. Walsh, No. MMX085005292S, 
2010 WL 4944629, at *11 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 19,2010) (noting that the burden of 
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the other contract doctrines that someone challenging or defending 
against the contract might use, including, but not limited to, contract 
interpretation,75 the contract policing doctrines 76 and defenses to 
performance,77 are literally outside the core-to use them one must 
assume that an otherwise valid contract has been formed; 78 and (3) 
practical realities, like the expense of litigation,19 the extensive use of 
proof for misrepresentation claim is on plaintiff who raised it and the burden of proof 
for defense of waiver is on defendant); Olive v. McNeal, 47 So. 3d 735, 739-40 
(Miss. Ct. App. 2010) ("The party seeking reformation of a deed on a mistake theory 
bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."); Grice Eng' g, Inc. v. 
Innovations Eng'g, Inc., No. 2009AP2757, 2010 WL 3768107, at *6 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Sept. 23, 2010) ("The burden of proving unconscionability is on the party alleging 
unconscionability. "). 
75. In contract interpretation, the contracting parties are now disputing what they meant 
when they manifested their assent to the contract. The court is called upon to decide 
which party's meaning prevails through the process of interpretation. 2 FARNSWORTH, 
supra note 38, § 7.7. If the parties did not think they were bound by a contract and, 
hence, subject to liability for failing to perform, common sense says that no one would 
be asking a court to determine whose meaning prevails, i.e., the interpretive question 
posed by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201. The existence of a valid 
contract must therefore be presumed. See also Eugene F. Mooney, Old Kontract 
Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Our New 
Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L. REv. 213, 246 (1966) ("The parol evidence rule, plain 
meaning rule and traditional maxims of construction employed by courts to interpret 
contracts all reinforce the notion of a rigorous doctrine of pacta sunt servanda 
[agreements should be kept]."). See generally Hart, supra note 5, at 200--01 n.l47. 
76. Specifically, if established on the facts, all the contract policing doctrines, such as 
duress and misrepresentation, either result in a voidable contract or make a contract 
unenforceable in whole or in part. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§§ 164 (misrepresentation-voidable contract), 175 (duress-voidable contract), 177 
(undue influence-voidable contract), 208 (unconscionability-unenforceable 
contract) (1981). Clearly, a contract has to exist in the first instance to thereafter be 
made voidable or unenforceable. See Hart, supra note 5, at 201 n.149. 
77. Defenses to performance would include but not be limited to claims of mistake 
(mutual and unilateral), as well as impracticability of performance and frustration of 
purpose. By definition, these doctrines only apply to contracts already in existence. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (1981) ("Where a mistake of both 
parties [exists] at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on which the 
contract was made . .. , the contract is voidable .... ") (emphasis added); id. § 153 
(unilateral mistake); id. § 261 (impracticability of performance-"[w]here, after a 
contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable ... , his duty to render 
that performance is discharged .... ") (emphasis added); id. § 265 (frustration of 
purpose--containing similar language to § 261); see Hart, supra note 5, at 201 n.150. 
78. Hart, supra note 5, Part III.B.2. 
79. Lawsuits are very expensive. See Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Incomplete 
Contracts in a Complete Contract World, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 725, 737 (2006) 
("Litigation costs, specifically attorney fees, make it expensive to pursue a contract 
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certain boilerplate contract clauses,80 and the fact that courts rarely let 
parties out of their contracts, regardless of the legal excuse 
advanced,81 make a successful rebuttal of the presumption of contract 
validity highly unlikely.82 
claim."); Hart, supra note 5, at 212 n.209; F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in 
Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 275, 326 (2008) ("Lawsuits are 
expensive and time consuming, and therefore most individuals will not bring a suit 
that has little or no potential for a damages award."); Robert Sprague & Karen L. 
Page, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the Entrepreneur: Protecting 
Naive Issuersfrom Sophisticated Investors, 8 WYO. L. REV. 167, 175 (2008) ("Filing a 
lawsuit initiates a long, complex, and expensive process."). 
80. These clauses include, for example, mandatory arbitration provisions, forum selection 
clauses, and choice of law clauses, all of which have been found valid by the courts. 
See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-92 (2000) 
(arbitration clause); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 
(1995) (arbitration clause); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595-97 
(1991) (forum selection clause); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 
20,26-35 (1991) (arbitration clause); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 
213, 223-24 (1985) (arbitration clause); M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 
U.S. 1,2 (1972) (forum selection clause); Johnson v. Ventra Grp., Inc., 191 F.3d 732, 
741 (6th Cir. 1999) (choice oflaw clause); Wang Labs., Inc. v. Kagan, 990 F.2d 1126, 
1128-29 (9th Cir. 1993) (choice of law clause); Milanovich v. Costa Crociere, S.p.A., 
954 F.2d 763, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (choice of law clause); Interfirst Bank Clifton v. 
Fernandez, 853 F.2d 292, 293-95 (5th Cir. 1988) (choice of law clause); Hart, supra 
note 5, at 213 n.212. 
81. According to Professor Robert Lloyd: 
We spend so much time on the unusual cases where courts find a 
way to let people out of their bad deals that students begin to think 
these cases are the norm. Students are amazed when I tell them 
that it is virtually unheard of for a sophisticated party, or even a 
party only moderately sophisticated, to prevail on an 
unconscionability argument. Yes, you can win an 
unconscionability case if your client is poor and uneducated, and 
if the other party is a sleazy organization that preys on poor 
people, and if you're able to afford an appeal, and if you get 
Skelly Wright on the bench. But absent these circumstances, the 
client is going to be stuck with the documents she signs. 
Robert M. Lloyd, Making Contracts Relevant: Thirteen Lessons for the First-Year 
Contracts Course, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.1. 257, 267 (2004) (footnote omitted); see also E. 
Allan Farnsworth, Developments in Contract Law During the 1980 's: The Top Ten, 
41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 203, 225 (1990) (,,[C]ontinued expansion of 
unconscionability and related doctrines did not occur in the 1980s as expected."); 
Hart, supra note 5, at 214-15 n.216; Robert A. Hillman, Contract Excuse and 
Bankruptcy Discharge, 43 STAN. L. REv. 99, 99 (1990) ("Notwithstanding academic 
writing that reports or urges expansion of the grounds of excuse, courts actually 
remain extremely reluctant to release parties from their obligations."); Knapp, Private, 
supra note 46, at 775 (noting that the burden of persuasion with respect to 
unconscionability claims "is at best difficult, [and] at worst literally impossible to 
satisfy"); Morant, MLK, supra note 40, at 110 ("The existence of . . . duress, 
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The practical consequence of the presumption of contract validity 
under either contract law system, therefore, is that a contract fonned 
via mutual assent and consideration will usually be binding, which is 
the first component of a "binding contract," and all of its terms 
(reasonable and unreasonable) will most likely be enforceable in 
court.83 Enforceability, of course, represents the second component 
unconscionability, and undue influence cannot, by themselves, sufficiently 
accommodate marketplace inequities. The very dearth of cases where individuals are 
successful in obtaining relief through those devices substantiates this point. This 
result is compounded by the heavy burden of proof placed upon the claimant of such 
relief." (footnotes omitted)). 
82. See generally Hart, supra note 5, at 212-15. 
83. There are "efficient terms" and "fair use" objections to the claim made in the text that 
all the terms of a contract, including the unreasonable ones, would probably be valid 
and enforceable. The efficient terms objection is that terms in standard forms are 
efficient, even if most people do not read them, either because (I) a profit-maximizing 
business will offer optimal terms under the assumption that the preferences of the 
marginal consumer are the same as those of the average consumer, see Florencia 
Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts: The 
Case of Software License Agreements, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 449 (2008) 
[hereinafter, Marotta-Wurgler, Competition] (discussing the argument of A. Michael 
Spence, Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6:2 BELL J. ECON. 417, 417-29 (1975)); 
or (2) there is a subset of informed buyers who do read the terms of standard forms 
and are, therefore, willing to pay more for products with better standard terms. 
Because a business cannot discriminate between reading and non-reading buyers, the 
self-interested business will offer better terms to all buyers. Marotta-Wurgler, 
Competition, supra at 454 (discussing the argument of Alan Schwartz & Louis L. 
Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630 (1979)). 
Two brief responses to the efficient terms objection are in order. To begin with, 
whether "efficient" is all that can or should be expected from terms in standard form 
contracts is debatable. CfMichael B. Dorff & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Is There a 
Method to the Madness? Why Creative and Counterintuitive Proposals Are 
Counterproductive, in THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 21, 22 
(Mark D. White ed., 2009). In addition, initial empirical research by Professor 
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, makes me very skeptical of the efficient terms objection. 
Marotta-Wurgler's research finds that standard terms in software license agreements 
are biased in favor of sellers (the party that drafted the forms). Marotta-Wurgler, 
Competition, supra at 459-63. Much more empirical work needs to be done to decide 
this particular objection, one way or the other. 
Even assuming there are unreasonable terms in a contract, the fair use objection 
questions whether the stronger, and presumably drafting, party will actually enforce 
them, given fairness and reputational norms that would constrain such behavior. 
Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REv. 679, 
703 (2004) (arguing that the "holder of an entitlement ... may unilaterally waive or 
underenforce that entitlement[.)"); id at 708; see also id at 707 (the reputational 
norm); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
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of a binding contract, because enforceability overtly implicates the 
state.84 Specifically, the state will use its sovereign power (i.e., its 
"judges, sheriffs, and other state agents") on behalf of one party to 
enforce the rights expressed in that contract against the resisting 
party.85 Thus, modem contract law, just like classical contract law, 
makes contracts binding. 
The implications for the parties to the contract cannot be 
overlooked or overstated. Because contracts are made binding in the 
ways described above, the party that gets to dictate or impose terms 
during contract formation will usually get to keep and use those terms 
in the event of any subsequent contract dispute. 86 Clearly, the party 
that has the ability to impose terms during contract formation is the 
party with the bargaining power to do so. Hence, formation is the 
core, because this is where the stronger contracting party's power 
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1513-15 (1998) (the fairness norm). 
This objection also poses an empirical question, and I am unaware of any study that 
addresses it. Notwithstanding the lack of empirical evidence, I am very skeptical of 
this objection as well. The extent of market constraints placed on sellers by 
reputational concerns is contested at best and is arguably rather minimal. See Richard 
Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REv. 657, 723-24 (1985); 
Peter V. Letsou, The Political Economy 0/ Consumer Credit Regulation, 44 EMORY 
LJ. 587, 595 & n.21 (1995); Stephen J. Lubben, Railroad Receiverships and Modem 
Bankruptcy Theory, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 1420, n.lO (2004); Robert E. Scott, A 
Relational Theory o/Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901,907 & n.23 (1986). 
Finally, institutional constraints could undercut the fairness norms. Briefly, the 
people responsible for enforcement decisions within a company (e.g., legal counsel) 
will likely be different from the people who initially sold the product or service (e.g., 
the sales department). Different considerations, therefore, would motivate the 
enforcement decision. 
Finally, both the efficient terms and fair use objections discount too steeply (i) the 
potential in terrorem effect the existence of unreasonable terms in the contract could 
have on the weaker party if a dispute were to arise during performance of the contract; 
(ii) the bargaining advantage such terms provide the stronger party in any settlement 
negotiations; and, ultimately, (iii) the fact that such terms would be asserted by the 
stronger party in any ensuing litigation, unless the client agreed otherwise. It is 
difficult to envision the litigation scenario in which a client would instruct its 
attorneys not to use any terms in the contract that would benefit it in the litigation. 
Absent the client's consent to refrain from using such terms, the attorney(s) for the 
stronger party could be violating ethical rules by failing to assert claims or defenses 
based on unreasonable terms in the contract. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT PREAMBLE '\1'\12, 19, R. 1.1, l.3 (2007); Hart, supra note 5, at 216. 
84. See Hart, supra note 5, at 212-15. 
85. Cohen, Contract, supra note 32, at 585-86; see also Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 
483-85. 
86. See generally Hart, supra note 5, at 216-17. 
2011J Contract Law Now-Reality Meets Legal Fictions 21 
becomes embedded and largely immunized from effective 
challenge.87 
Finally, in addition to its core, underlying assumptions and end 
result, there is one other aspect of the modem contract law system 
that must be taken into account. Perhaps not surprisingly, the 
framework for modem contract law is designed to be self-
legitimating. 88 This point is illustrated by the way in which the 
system approaches problems. Specifically, because the modem 
contract law system is premised on the assumptions discussed above, 
it means that problems within contract law are acknowledged only if 
they contradict one or more of those assumptions.89 From there, a 
remedy is adopted, which mayor may not actually work, but is one 
that will nevertheless reaffirm and thereby relegitimate the 
assumption( s) originally contradicted.90 
For example, modem contract law assumes that unequal 
bargaining power exists,91 but in an unproblematic way.92 Unequal 
bargaining power, however, presents significant problems for modem 
contract law when it is used to procure a one-sided (or bad) bargain.93 
It also presents a problem when it takes the form of information 
87. Id. 
88. That the framework is self-legitimating is not surprising, because any system that 
purports to be comprehensive, like modern contract law claims to be, would have to 
be able to address problems that come up in ways that do not end up undermining the 
entire system. Cf Feinman, Critical, supra note 58, at 832 (demonstrating how 
modern contract law attempted to solve the problems of classical contract law but in a 
way that did not completely undermine the former system); Feinman, Theory, supra 
note 36 (documenting the ways in which modern contract law addressed various 
critiques leveled against the system); Gabel & Feinman, supra note 45 (exposing the 
legitimating function contract law serves in society in general). My concern, 
therefore, is not that the framework is self-legitimizing but rather in discovering and 
exposing what else the framework legitimizes. 
89. See Kennedy, supra note 42, at 576. 
90. Much of the discussion in the text is based on Duncan Kennedy's discussion of 
unequal bargaining power. See generally id. at 620-24. 
91. It is a form of market imperfection. See supra text accompanying notes 1-45 (modern 
system acknowledging market imperfections); Kennedy, supra note 42, at 577; 
Morant, MLK, supra note 40, at 96. 
92. Barnhizer, Inequality, supra note 15, at 144 "The legal doctrine of inequality of 
bargaining power occupies a strange place in contract law. As an explicitly 
acknowledged legal concept, inequality of bargaining power is seemingly of little 
moment. . .. [I]nequality of bargaining power alone is not a sufficient justification for 
judicial intervention into contract disputes." Id. It is simply not explicitly discussed. 
93. See generally Hart, supra note 5. 
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asymmetry94 (i.e., when one party is in possession of relevant 
information that is deemed necessary for the other party to make an 
informed decision about whether to enter into a contract).95 
To correct the problems of bad bargains and information 
asymmetry, modem contract law relies upon its contract policing 
doctrines and disclosure statutes, respectively.96 Unfortunately, these 
solutions do not work very wel1.97 But by providing solutions, the 
modern contract law system is able to show that the problem of 
unequal bargaining power merely requires "reform of exceptional 
cases and intelligent response to abuses. ,,98 In other words, because 
problems created by unequal bargaining power can be remedied with 
discrete and relatively easy-to-implement solutions, unequal 
bargaining power is shown to be the exception,99 not the norm. 100 
And because it can essentially treat unequal bargaining power as the 
exception, modem contract law is able to reaffirm and re-legitimize 
its assumption that unequal bargaining power exists but only at the 
94. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Bargaining Power in Contract Theory, in VISIONS OF 
CONTRACT THEORY 85, 93-94 (Larry A. Dimatteo, Robert A. Prentice, Blake D. 
Morant, and Daniel D. Barnhizer 2007) [hereinafter, Barnhizer, Bargaining Power] 
("Legal and nonlegal observers recognize qualities such as superior information ... as 
sources of power."); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl. E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated 
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 647, 649 (2011) ("[The purpose of mandatory 
disclosure is] to keep the discloser from abusing its superior position."). 
95. Cf Barnhizer, Inequality, supra note 15, at 147 ("[F]raud, deceit or misrepresentation 
may be analyzed as an inequality of bargaining power generated by a monopoly on 
truthful information held by one party to a transaction."). 
96. See Hart, supra note 5 (documenting that the expanded contract policing doctrines-
unconscionability, economic duress, and misrepresentation-were modern contract's 
solution to the unequal bargaining power that produces a bad bargain problem); infra 
Part I.B (discussing purpose of disclosure statutes). 
97. See Hart, supra note 5 (explaining in detail why contract policing doctrines do not 
adequately address the unequal bargaining power that produces a bad bargain 
problem); infra Part III.B (explaining why disclosure statutes do not work). 
98. Kennedy, supra note 42, at 620. 
99. Robert W. Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in 
Contract Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 565, 571 (1985) ("Modern contract scholars tend to 
see ... relations of domination as aberrational situations, which, for good or evil ... 
contract law has evolved various curative doctrines to police. In other words, there is 
not that much of a problem, and contract law can take care of what problem there 
is."). 
100. Kennedy, supra note 42, at 621 ("In this context, the doctrine of unequal bargaining 
power has the appeal that it presupposes that most of the time there is equal 
bargaining power, so that freedom of contract is the appropriate norm. It is an 
exceptional doctrine, unthreatening to basic arrangements, however critical of 
parti cu lar cases."). 
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margins, as an exception that proves the rule and supports the general 
paradigm of equality. 101 
By approaching problems in this way, specifically by defining 
perceived problems in terms of its assumptions and then providing 
solutions consistent with these assumptions, the modem contract law 
system is not only able to stave off criticism of the system as a whole, 
it can also show that its framework remains intact. Both of these by-
products are integral to the continuing operation of the modern 
contract law system. Indeed, this is what enables the modem contract 
law system to be self-legitimating. 
B. Disclosure Statutes as a Modern Contract Law Remedial Tool 
Disclosure statutes play an important role in the modem contract 
law system. They are certainly not new. They have been in use in 
the United States for decades 102 and a lot has been written about 
them. 103 At their most basic, disclosure statutes are statutes that 
101. A more concrete example of this phenomenon is laid out by Professor John Dawson in 
his 1947 article, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 253 
(1947). Dawson wrote: 
[A]n extreme disproportion in values in a bargain transaction 
requires explanation, and the explanation can usually be found in 
some misplaced reliance on the opposite party's good faith, some 
misleading partial disclosure, or some extreme inequality of the 
parties in knowledge, experience, or economic resources. If 
inequality in values is thus traced to its source in the conditions or 
the relations of the parties, the grant of judicial remedies seems no 
longer to endanger the economic foundations of an individualistic 
society. On the contrary, the function of judicial remedies [like 
economic duress, misrepresentation and unconscionability] 
becomes a policing function, the detection and correction of those 
factors which disturb and disrupt the "market." 
Id. at 281. 
102. See, e.g., William C. Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer 
Transactions, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 400, 400 (1973) [hereinafter, Whitford, Disclosure] 
("One of the oldest and most prevalent methods of regulating consumer transactions 
has been to require the seller to disclose to his consumer buyer various types of 
information about their contractual transaction.") (footnote omitted); 15 U.S.c. §§ 
1601-1615, 1631-1649, 1661, 1667(f) (2000 & Supp. III 2004) (implemented by the 
Federal Reserve Board via Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 (2005»; Magnuson-Moss 
Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, §§ 101-
112, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2000». 
103. See, e.g., Jo Carrillo, Dangerous Loans: Consumer Challenges to Adjustable Rate 
Mortgages, 5 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 1, 31, 33-43 (2008); Matthew A. Edwards, The 
Law, Marketing and Behavioral Economics of Consumer Rebates, 12 STAN. J.L. Bus. 
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require certain pieces of infonnation to be disclosed by one party to 
the other. 104 They exist to a large extent in the consumer protection 
arena (e.g., the Truth in Lending Ad05 and the Magnuson-Moss 
Warranty Act) but are not limited to this area. 106 For example, 
several provisions of Article 2 of the Unifonn Commercial Code also 
reqUIre disclosure, namely the provlSlons on good faith, 107 
& FIN. 362, 407-13 (2007); The Honorable Sheldon Gardner & Robert Kuehl, 
Acquiring an Historical Understanding of Duties to Disclose, Fraud, and Warranties, 
104 COM. LJ. 168, 181-82 (1999); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., An Economic Analysis of 
the Duty to Disclose Information: Lessons Learnedfrom the Caveat Emptor Doctrine, 
45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 119 (2008); Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday 
Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing 
Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1129-35 (2008); Alex Polonsky, "Tanks for the 
Memories:" Abandoning Caveat Emptor for the Transfers of Residential Property 
Contaminated with Petroleum from Leaking Underground Storage Tanks, 22 VT. L. 
REV. 979,1003 (1998); Kathleen McNamara Tomcho, Commercial Real Estate Buyer 
Beware: Sellers May Have the Right to Remain Silent, 70 S. CAL. L. Rev. 1571,1572, 
1589-90 (1997); Jessica P. Wilde, Violations of Zoning Ordinances, the Covenant 
Against Encumbrances, and Marketability of Title: How Purchasers Can Be Better 
Protected, 23 TOURO L. REV. 199, 228-32, 243-46 (2007); Willis, supra note 26; 
Whitford, Disclosure, supra note 102. 
104. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 94, at 649. 
105. Truth in Lending Act, IS V.S.c. §§ 1601-1615, 1631-1649, 1661, 1667(f) (2000 & 
Supp. III 2004) (implemented by the Federal Reserve Board via Regulation Z, 12 
C.F.R. § 226 (2005)). 
106. Mandatory disclosure is certainly not limited to contract law. Torts and criminal law, 
for example, both have mandatory disclosure rules. In tort law, mandatory disclosure 
takes the form of the informed consent doctrine. In criminal law, the Miranda 
warnings constitute a mandatory disclosure rule. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra 
note 94, at 661-62 (informed consent and Miranda warnings, respectively). What all 
of these mandatory disclosures have in common is that they require certain disclosures 
to be made that will enable an individual to make an informed decision about her 
contracts, health care, or constitutional rights, for example. Id. at 3-15. 
107. Robert S. Summers, writing in 1968, discussed good faith in terms of an "excluder" 
analysis, meaning that good faith was to be defined, or would "take[] on specific and 
variant meanings by way of contrast with the specific and variant forms of bad faith 
which judges decide to prohibit." Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General 
Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. 
REV. 195,202 (1968). Summers argued that good faith included the duty to disclose 
material facts under certain circumstances. Id. at 203; see also Emily M.S. Houh, 
Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality Approach to the Doctrine of 
Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1025, 1028 (2003). In discussing 
Summers's work, Houh writes, "because courts define the withholding of relevant 
information in the contracting process as bad faith, a contracting party must disclose 
all such information in order to satisfy the implied obligation of good faith." Id. See 
generally V.C.c. §§ 1-20I(b)(20), 1-304, 2-103(1)(b) (2001). 
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unconscionability,108 and warranty,109 and they apply to merchants as 
well as consumers. I 10 
Several related reasons for disclosure statutes are advanced by 
courts and scholars. Disclosure statutes supposedly limit the 
advantage of the party with superior bargaining power, III allow the 
market to work,1I2 and allow for the possibility of individual 
choice.1I3 By putting all of this together, it appears that the main 
108. See U.c.c § 2-302 (2001); Whitford, Disclosure, supra note 102, at 401 (citing 
unconscionability as the example, Whitford notes that "[t]he Uniform Commercial 
Code, in what few efforts it makes to regulate consumer transactions, generally 
stresses disclosure regulation"). See generally Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability 
and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 498 (\ 967). 
109. See U.C.C §§ 2-313 (express warranties), 2-314 (the implied warranty of 
merchantability), 2-316 (disclaimer of warranties) (2001); Summers, supra note 107, 
at 229-30 (arguing that good faith may require sellers to disclose information to their 
buyers under their obligation to sell "merchantable goods" per the implied warranty of 
merchantability). 
110. Nothing in the text or comments of any of the cited Article 2 provisions limits their 
application to consumer transactions. 
Ill. Cf JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 10.1, at 430 
(3d ed. 1987) (discussing government controls generally). 
112. Scott J. Burnham, The Regulation of Rent-To-Own Transactions, 3 Loy. CONSUMER 
L. REV. 40, 41 (1991) ("The theory behind disclosure is that it allows the market to 
work. Theoretically, consumers who know what interest rates are offered by various 
sellers will 'shop around' for favorable credit terms just as they shop around for the 
price of the goods themselves."); Michael J. Wisdom, An Empirical Study of the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1117, 1117 (\ 979) ("The stated 
purposes of the [Magnuson-Moss Warranty] Act were to improve the clarity and 
accuracy of information contained in consumer product warranties and to increase 
competition in the marketing of consumer products."). See generally Florencia 
Marotta-Wurgler, Does Disclosure Matter? 1-3 (N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., 
Working Paper No. 10-54, 2010), available at http://ssrn.comiabstract=1713860 
[hereinafter Marotta-Wurgler, Disclosure] (reviewing several disclosure initiatives 
whose purpose was to improve market functions). 
113. Cf W. Kip Viscusi, Individual Rationality, Hazard Warnings, and the Foundations of 
Tort Law, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 625, 629 (1996) (arguing, in essence, that hazard 
warnings, which are clearly a type of disclosure, are attractive because they allow for 
the possibility of individual choice). "The flexibility of warnings enables those who 
are unwilling to incur risks to take appropriate precautions or to avoid the risky 
activity, and also enables individuals who are willing to engage in the risky behavior 
to do so." Id.; see also Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism 
Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 704-05 
(1999) (discussing the Viscusi article). Cf LOUIS KApLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, 
MICROECONOMICS 40 (2004) ("[W]hen government provides information about 
products to consumers, individuals can decide on the basis of their desires after 
considering the information whether to purchase those products. Hence, purchase 
decisions tend to be socially desirable."). The same argument would seem to apply 
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reason for adopting a disclosure· regime is to correct bargaining 
imbalances and market failure, primarily in the form of information 
asymmetries, thereby improving the quality of the contractual 
decisions made. 114 
Thus, despite being creatures of statute, disclosure statutes are a 
quintessential modem contract law remedial tool for two reasons. 
First, they incorporate the norms of both the classical and modern 
systems. 115 They preserve individual autonomy, the core value of the 
classical legal system,116 while simultaneously deploying the modern 
norms of fairness and cooperation. 117 More specifically, disclosure 
statutes protect the parties' freedom of contract-the classical 
autonomy value l18-by continuing to allow the parties to contract for 
essentially whatever they want. At the same time, they marginally 
limit the parties' power to contract by mandating disclosure of certain 
relevant information, which represents a deployment of the modern 
norms of fairness and cooperation. 119 
when a party, as opposed to the government and pursuant to a disclosure requirement, 
provides the information to the consumer. 
114. Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False Dichotomies of Contract Law, 40 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295, 324 (2005); John Roddy, Reversing Field: Is There a 
Trend Toward Abrogating Truth in Lending?, 1998 PRAC. LAW INST. COMM. LAW AND 
PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 637, 642, available at 772 PLI/Comm 637 (West 
1998) ("The purpose of TILA is to enable consumers to intelligently shop for 
credit."); Whitford, Disclosure, supra note 102, at 403 ("[P]roponents of disclosure 
statutes typically presume that conspicuous and comprehensible disclosure will cause 
many consumers to change their buying behavior so as either to refrain from buying 
particular products or services that they otherwise would have bought, or to shop more 
carefully among competing products or services."). Cf Edward L. Rubin, Types of 
Contracts, Interventions of Law, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1903, 1910-11 (2000) 
(discussing information asymmetry as a particular type of market failure). 
115. Recall that the modem contract law system supplements, but does not replace, the 
classical norms of individual autonomy and liberty with norms of fairness and 
cooperation. See supra notes 44-46. 
116. See supra text accompanying note 45. 
117. See supra text accompanying note 44. 
118. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 94, at 681 ("[M]andated disclosure serves the 
autonomy principle. It implements the belief that people make better decisions for 
themselves than anyone can make for them and that people are presumptively entitled 
to freedom in making decisions."). 
119. By requiring the party with superior information to share it with her contracting 
partner, disclosure statues deploy the modem contract law norms of fairness (by 
attempting to level at least the information playing field) and cooperation (by literally 
mandating the disclosure of relevant information). 
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Second, disclosure statutes are designed to affect the core of 
contract law (fonnation)'20 while simultaneously leaving it intact. 
That is, the primary purpose of disclosure statues is to alleviate 
bargaining inequalities, at least in the fonn of some information 
asymmetry,l2l thereby increasing the quality of the "weaker 
contracting party's,,122 mutual assent. Disclosing relevant 
information during the contract formation stage, in other words, is 
supposed to produce an informed choice. It is then much easier to 
justify holding a party to her contract via the presumption of contract 
validity'23 if that party appears to have made an informed decision to 
enter into the contract to begin with. Disclosure statutes, therefore, 
affect the core of contract by specifically targeting and manipulating 
mutual assent. But ultimately, and consistent with the modern 
contract law system's approach to formation,'24 disclosure statutes 
leave the core completely intact, because mutual assent is established 
and a contract is still formed. 
Disclosure statutes, therefore, fit squarely within the modern 
contract law framework. This is because all of the framework's 
underlying assumptions '25 are at work in a disclosure-statute scenario. 
Specifically, if a contracting party receives certain disclosures in a 
specific manner, then that party will, in the first instance, read and 
understand them. 126 Thus, for example, under TILA, creditors are 
required to disclose in writing to the borrower, among many other 
things,127 the finance charge '28 and the annual percentage rate. 129 
120. See supra text accompanying notes 64-71 (discussing formation as core of contract 
law). 
121. See supra text accompanying notes 111-16 (discussing the primary purpose of 
disclosure statutes). 
122. By "weaker contracting party," I am simply referring to the contracting party that is 
not in possession of the information deemed relevant by the disclosure statute or rule. 
123. See supra text accompanying notes 69-82 (discussing the presumption of contract 
validity). 
124. See supra text accompanying notes 64-71 (discussing modem contract's approach to 
formation). 
125. See supra notes 56-65. 
126. Cf Willis, supra note 26, at 748 ("[The thicker conception of the rational actor] 
assumes that [people] will, once given the information in the disclosures, use it to 
choose whether and which loan to take based on a rational calculus of their financial 
self-interest. "). 
127. For example, the creditor is required to disclose the "total sale price," the "total of 
payments," and any dollar charge or percentage amount that may be imposed solely 
because of a late payment. See IS U.S.c. § J638(a)(7) (2000) (total sale price); id. § 
1638(a)(5) (total of payments); id. § 1 638(a)(l 0) (late payment charges). 
128. 15 U.S.c. § 1638(a)(3) (2000). 
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Once provided with these disclosures, the theory is that the borrower 
in the TILA example will then be able to make an informed 
contractual decision about what the loan will cost and whether she 
can afford it. 130 
The decision that modem contract law is ultimately concerned 
with, however, is the borrower's decision about whether to enter into 
the contract or not. If the hypothetical borrower chooses to enter into 
the contract with the lender under these circumstances, then society 
can feel comfortable and even justified holding that borrower to that 
contract. I3l 
Disclosure statutes therefore seem to presuppose that the contracts 
formed after mandated disclosures are private transactions between 
private parties who are most likely strangers to one another and 
therefore bargaining at arm's length (i.e., CitiMortgage and Mary 
Smith, in the hypothetical); individuals act as rational market actors 
in reaching their contractual decisions, meaning that the individual 
who receives the information via the disclosure statute will be able to 
correctly process that information and then rank her preferences 
according to her expected utility; and any imperfections in the market 
in the form of information asymmetries will not have an adverse 
impact on the parties' contractual decisions because disclosure 
statutes were specifically created to remedy them. 
If these premises are correct, the argument continues, then parties 
should be free to bargain over just about anything they want (which 
is, of course, the very classical freedom of contract ideal); 132 and the 
law should give their bargain literal effect, that is, protect the parties' 
"justified" contractual expectations, because that contract is the 
129. 15 U.S.c. § 1664(d) (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226.24 (2005); see also Willis, supra note 
26, at 744 ("The APR is intended to express the total annual cost of borrowing, 
including interest and other scheduled charges and fees imposed by the lender ... so 
that borrowers can comparison price shop .... "). 
130. KApLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 113, at 38 ("By providing consumers with 
information, government enables them to base their purchase decisions on correct 
information and thereby to avoid mistakes."); Willis, supra note 26, at 712. 
131. Cf Morant, Race, supra, note 44 at 909-10 ("Emphasis is placed upon the 
enforcement of agreements if objective assent is manifested."); Omri Ben-Shahar, The 
Myth of the "Opportunity to Read" in Contract Law,S EUR. REv. CONT. L. 1, (John 
M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 415, 2008) [hereinafter, Ben-Shahar, 
Myth] ("[The] idea of implied-assent-to-available-but-unread-terms is appealing to 
scholars because of the premise ... that it accords greater respect to individuals-that 
it bolsters the 'autonomy' of people."). 
132. Freedom of contract is also the embodiment of the classical individual autonomy 
norm writ large. 
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product of their voluntary and informed choice. \33 This latter 
statement is, of course, freedom of contract's well-known corollary 
that contracts should be kept. 134 The state's role in all of this is very 
neutral and minimal, having specified only that disclosures are 
required in certain limited commercial contracting situations, and the 
content of the disclosures to be made. 135 
II. CONTRACTS AND STATE POWER 
The problem with making contracts binding is that all of the 
assumptions modern contract law relies on 136 to justify this cardinal 
principle are deeply problematic in theory and in practice. 137 Because 
133. ATIYAH, supra note 51, at 403 ("[The fifth principle of classical contract law was that] 
the content of the contract, the terms and the price and the subject-matter, are entirely 
for the parties to settle."); Morant, Race, supra note 44, at 901 ("Self-governance and 
private autonomy undergird the classical theory, elaborated by the belief that private 
parties were in the best positions to fashion bargains appropriate for their needs. As a 
consequence, there is no need for paternalistic [state] intervention since autonomous 
individuals, exercising their free will and driven by their own preferences, will 
ostensibly formulate an agreement which is fitting and deserved."). 
134. Given the way the modern contract law system is set up, this corollary actually means 
that contracts that are freely entered into will usually be enforced. This is because the 
corollary in practice takes the form of an almost insurmountable presumption of 
contract validity. See supra Part I.A (discussing the ways in which modern contract 
law makes contracts binding); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts 0/ Adhesion-Some 
Thoughts About Freedom o/Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 629-31 (1943); Mark 
Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom o/Contract, and The "Rise and Fall", 79 B.U. L. REV. 
263, 287 (1999) ("The traditional view is that freedom increases or decreases as 
freedom of contract increases or decreases. Freedom is maximized by allowing 
individuals to enter into contracts without fear of governmental sanctions for doing so, 
and by government enforcing those contracts-against the will of one of the 
contracting parties, if necessary." (footnote omitted»; Todd D. Rakoff, Is "Freedom 
From Contract" Necessarily A Libertarian Freedom?, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 477,479-
80 (analyzing Sir George Jessel's famous statement about freedom of contract and 
arguing that freedom of contract includes "three legal points: agreements (1) 'when 
entered into freely and voluntarily,' (2) 'shall be held sacred,' and (3) 'shall be 
enforced"'); Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 479 ("[The classical theorists'] basic 
model assumed that the parties were free to agree on whatever terms they wanted. 
Freedom of contract meant that the parties were free to make or not make contracts, 
and that when they made contracts the courts would enforce the terms to which the 
parties had agreed. "). 
135. See supra text accompanying notes 127-33. 
136. See supra Part I.A. 
137. Ben-Shahar, Myth, supra note 131, at 2 ("Contract law owes its foundations to the 
days of the arm's length bargain ... -to the notion that contract provisions come 
prior to the transaction and are known and custom designed by the parties. . .. It is a 
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the assumptions are dubious at best, modem contract law cannot 
justify holding parties to their contracts. Nevertheless, contract law 
continues to do just that. Consequently, continuing to bind parties to 
their contracts, absent the justification that the assumptions provide, 
is an unmitigated exercise of state power. 138 Such use of state power 
smacks of absolutism, which stands in stark contrast to the 
characterization of contract law as promoting voluntary transactions 
between private parties. 
A. The Assumptions in Theory and Practice 
There are six 139 well-established assumptions that modem contract 
law uses to justify making contracts binding and explain modem 
contract's use of disclosure statutes as a remedial tool. 140 In this part, 
the contra-assumption for each of the six postulates is argued to 
document the claim that all six of them are flawed in theory and in 
practice. 
1. The Market Is Not Self-Regulating or Largely Outside State 
Control 
The Legal Realists showed us more than three-quarters of a 
century ago that the market is not self-regulating or largely outside of 
state control. They argued that the creation of the state was 
specifically intended to alter the distribution of power and wealth in 
heroic scholarly ideal, however, to preserve this module in the era of mass standard 
fonn contracts."). 
138. A few words on the distinction being drawn in the text between state power and 
unmitigated state power should suffice. It is abundantly clear that contracts are only 
binding because the state says they are. See infra Part II.A.3. By definition, "[a] 
contract is a promise ... for the breach of which the law gives a remedy." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § I (1981). Since a contract is only a 
contract if the law says it is, it seems redundant to belabor what in essence is already a 
truism. The point the article is making, however, is that the contract law system relies 
on assumptions about the contracting parties to justifY the use of state power to make 
contracts binding. See supra text accompanying notes 55-65 (discussing the 
assumptions). Absent the justification provided by the assumptions, therefore, making 
contracts binding becomes an unmitigated use of state power. 
139. Some of the assumptions are so related to one another that the only logical way to 
discuss them is together. For example, the modem contract law assumption about the 
role of the state subsumes the claims that (1) the state's role is neutral and minimal, 
and (2) contracts are between two private parties. See infra Part II.A.4. 
140. See supra text accompanying notes 55-65 (the assumptions), 120-130 (relationship to 
disclosure statutes). 
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society.141 This goal was accomplished through legal rules. Indeed, 
it was widely understood that legal rules were necessary because real 
freedom depended "upon opportunities supplied by institutions that 
involve legal regulation.,,142 It was also understood that "mere 
freedom as absence of restraint, without positive power to achieve 
what we deem good, is empty and of no real value.,,143 The state 
therefore created legal rules, both formal (i.e., through legislation, 
agency rules, and court decisionsY44 and "informal," via private 
agreement. 145 
The legal rules created by private agreement were predicated on 
property rights,146 which eventually included the right to contract. 147 
The property rights a person owned determined that person's 
bargaining power in the markee48 and, ultimately, what that person 
141. Cohen, Contract, supra note 32, at 562; Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 482. See 
generally Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8, 10-11 
(1928) [hereinafter Cohen, Property]; Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and 
Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 603 (1943) [hereinafter Hale, Duress]; 
Robert L. Hale, Law Making by Unofficial Minorities, 20 COLUM. L. REv. 451 (1920) 
[hereinafter Hale, Minorities]. This insight is also well-established in historical 
discourse. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN 
LABOR MOVEMENT (1991); HENDRICK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE 
POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870 
(1983); RICHARD R. JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS: THE AMERICAN POSTAL SYSTEM 
FROM FRANKLIN TO MORE (1995); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW 
AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996); CHRISTOPHER L. 
TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REpUBLIC (1993). 
142. Cohen, Contract, supra note 32, at 591; see also Joseph W. Singer, Things That We 
Would Like to Take for Granted: Minimum Standards for the Legal Framework of a 
Free and Democratic Society, 2 HARV. L. & POL'y REv. 139, 141 (2008) [hereinafter 
Singer, Standards] ("[The Legal Realists taught us that o]ur regulations, both statutory 
and common law, shape the house that we live in, and the liberty that we value comes 
from having built that house and the environment around it."). 
143. Cohen, Contract, supra note 32, at 560; see also id. at 561-62 ("[T]he theory of ... 
non-interference of the government in business[] is not really held consistently by 
those who so frequently invoke it."). 
144. !d. at 586. 
145. Cohen, Property, supra note 141, at 11-14; Robert L. Hale, Coercion and 
Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 471-74 (1923) 
[hereinafter Hale, Coercion]; Mensch, History, supra note 35, at 34-35; Singer, 
Realism, supra note 35, at 487-88. 
146. Cohen, Property, supra note 141, at 11-14; Hale, Coercion, supra note 145, at 471-
74; Mensch, History, supra note 35, at 34-35; Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 487-
88. 
147. Cohen, Contract, supra note 32, at 570. 
148. Needless to say, the more one party owns, the more bargaining power that party has 
and the more that party can dictate contract terms. See generally Hale, Duress, supra 
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would be allowed to acquire. 149 Ownership, therefore, also bestowed 
the power on individuals to dictate legal rules via their agreements 
because the state enforced the rights contained in a contract. 150 
Indeed, the legal rules embodied in agreements and promises l51 were 
enforced specifically "to enable people to rely on them ... and thus 
make the path of enterprise more secure.,,152 In fact, an increase in 
commercial activity inevitably led to more regulation. 153 
F onnal and informal legal rules, therefore, existed and continue to 
exist by virtue of the existence of the state itself. Legal rules simply 
do not exist separate and apart from the fabric of society or the 
market. Legal rules create both. 
Thus, the Realists argued persuasively that the market is itself a 
regulatory structure created by the state. 154 Our existing and 
developing formal and informal legal rules create a comprehensive 
network of regulations. ISS This network of regulations provides both 
the foundation and framework upon which the supposedly self-
note 141, at 627-28 ("[T]he law endows some with rights that are more advantageous 
than those with which it endows others. It is with these unequal rights that men 
bargain and exert pressure on one another. These rights give birth to the unequal 
fruits of bargaining."). 
149. According to Morris Cohen: 
Property law . . . determines what men shall acquire. Thus, 
protecting the property rights of a landlord means giving him the 
right to collect rent, protecting the property of a railroad or a 
public service corporation means giving it the right to make 
certain charges. Hence the ownership of land and machinery, 
with the rights of drawing rent, interest, etc. determines the future 
distribution of the goods that will come into being---determines 
what share of such goods various individuals shall acquire. 
Cohen, Property, supra note 141, at 13. 
150. Cohen, Contract, supra note 32, at 585-87. 
151. Morris Cohen explains: 
[W]hen a trade union makes an agreement with an association of 
employers, or even with a single employer, the result is law not 
only for those "represented" at the signing of the papers but for all 
those who wish to enter the industry at any time that the 
agreement is in force. This is in general true of all more or less 
permanently organized partnerships, companies, corporations, or 
other groups; and enforceable agreements between individuals, no 
matter on how limited a scale, are similarly part of the law by 
virtue of the general rules of state action that apply to them. 
ld. at 587. 
152. ld. at 555-57,587,591. 
153. ld. at 558. 
154. Singer, Standards, supra note 142, at 141. 
155. LEGAL REALISM, supra note 35, at 99-100; Singer, Standards, supra note 142, at 150. 
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regulating, free market is built, operated, and continues to operate. 156 
Indeed, absent the legal structure provided by state-imposed 
regulation (e.g., courts, legislatures, agencies), the self-regulating free 
market would be unrecognizable as a market at all. 157 
Markets, however, are not just shaped by regulation. Deregulation 
also has to be taken into account because when the state fails to 
intervene in or deregulates a particular market, the state effectively 
alters the power relations that take place within it. 158 By refraining 
from acting in a formal manner, the state essentially leaves informal 
rules and rule-making in place. 159 In effect, the state delegates to the 
party with more property rights and, hence, more bargaining power, 
the freedom to exercise superior bargaining power over the weaker 
party in a given market. 160 Thus, the state determines the distribution 
of power and wealth in society via its chosen mechanism of the 
market "both when it act[s] to limit freedom and when it fail[s] to 
limit the freedom of some to dominate others.,,161 The market, 
therefore, is not self-regulating or largely outside of state control. 
Of course, this discussion begs an important question. What is a 
"market?" At its most basic, a market is simply "[a] place of 
commercial activity in which articles are bought and sold.,,162 In 
marketing, however, a "market" requires three things. 163 There must 
be consumers or organizations interested in a particular product. 
Those consumers or organizations must have the resources to 
purchase the product. Finally, the law, including applicable 
regulations, must permit the consumers or organizations to acquire 
the product. 164 
156. Singer, Standards, supra note 142, at 150. 
157. Id. at 141. 
158. See supra text accompanying notes 141-56. 
159. See supra text accompanying notes 141-56. 
160. Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 482. Sometimes the state accomplishes this by 
designating something a "non-market." For example, there is technically no "market" 
for human organs, because it is illegal in the United States to sell one's organs. See 
National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274 (2006); NAT'L 
CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS OF UNIF. STATE LAWS, Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 
1987 § lO(a). 
161. Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 482; see also Cohen, Property, supra note 141, at 
10-13. 
162. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
163. Market Definition, NETMBA, http:www.netmba.com/marketing/marketldefinition/ 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2011). 
164. Id. 
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So in the hypothetical loan transaction between CitiMortgage and 
Ms. Smith, the relevant market depends on the product being bought 
and sold. One could argue that the home mortgage loan itself is the 
product, in which case the relevant market would be the financial 
market. But because Ms. Smith obtained the home mortgage loan 
only to enable her to purchase a single-family house, it seems more 
plausible that the product at issue in the hypothetical is the house 
itself, which makes for a much more complicated market. 
A veritable web of laws is implicated in constructing the 
residential housing market. For example, the construction of the real 
estate market in a particular locality, in this instance a racially 
segregated neighborhood (a.k.a. a "predominantly minority 
neighborhood"), is the result of specific government policies and 
actions,165 including, but not limited to, New Deal housing programs, 
like the Home Owners Loan Corporation,166 and agencies, 
particularly the Federal Housing Administration and Veterans 
Administration;167 federal and state highway programs;168 state urban 
165. For a much more complete discussion of the role of government in establishing and 
perpetuating racially segregated neighborhoods, see generally James A. Kushner, 
Apartheid in America: An Historical and Legal Analysis of Contemporary Racial 
Residential Segregation in the United States, 22 How. L.J. 547 (1979) and DOUGLAS 
S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE 
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993). Other sources include James A. Kushner, The 
Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Generation of Fair Housing, 42 
V AND. L. REv. 1049, 1061-67 (1989) [hereinafter, Kushner, Second] and Reggie Oh, 
Comment, Apartheid in America: Residential Segregation and the Colorline in the 
Twenty-First Century, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 385, 388-98 (1995). 
166. The Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) was a federal entity created in 1933 by 
the Roosevelt Administration. Oh, supra note 165, at 390. Its primary purpose was to 
increase home ownership among American families. Id. HOLC initiated and 
institutionalized discriminatory lending practices such that most black residents and 
neighborhoods received little to no federally subsidized mortgage loans. Id. at 391. 
As a result, the practices of HOLC ended up increasing home ownership only for 
white families in white neighborhoods. Id. at 390-91. 
167. According to Professor Kushner: 
The most dramatic cause of segregation, however, was the 
mortgage insurance and loan programs administered by the 
Veterans Administration and the Federal Housing Administration, 
programs which provided the financing for America's suburbs. 
Regulations required the financed properties to be segregated by 
conditioning subdivision approval on the inclusion of racial 
covenants or equitable servitudes. 
Kushner, Second, supra note 165, at 1063 (footnote omitted); see also Oh, supra note 
165, at 391-92. 
168. Kushner, Second, supra note 165, at 1064 ("The federal highway program also helped 
fund the segregated suburban exodus. In addition, state and local highway and urban 
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renewal programs; 169 and, perhaps surprisingly, United States 
Supreme Court cases like Brown v. Board of Education, 170 Milliken v. 
Bradley,171 and San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez. 172 Professor James Kushner argues that, "[a]n audit of 
current governmental spending, taxation, and other policies would 
disclose a pattern of programs and policies that carry a segregating 
impact and would implicate the federal government as the primary 
contributor to and implementor of segregation." 173 
And, of course, the loan that made the sale of the house in the 
hypothetical possible is a product of the financial market. The 
financial market, therefore, must also be considered a part of the 
larger residential housing market. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to list all of the laws 
implicated in fabricating the residential housing market, but it is 
possible to provide some indication of how extensive and pervasive 
the law is in creating it, by focusing on the financial market. I make 
no claim that the examples laid out below are exhaustive. Nor am I 
attempting to engage in the substantive debate about whether the 
regulation, or lack thereof, of the financial market was sufficient to 
stave off or minimize the financial crisis that accompanied the crash 
of the housing market in the United States. The examples provided, 
however, are illustrative of the larger point that markets are not self-
regulating or largely outside of state control. Indeed, the law created 
the market that enabled the subprime loan between CitiMortgage and 
Ms. Smith in the hypothetical to be made. 
renewal programs produced massive relocation which resettled white displacees in 
suburbia and blacks in the increasingly concentrated minority sections of central 
cities."). 
169. ld. 
170. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). According to Professor Kushner, 
"though invalidating intentionally segregated public schools, [Brown] encouraged 
white flight to the suburbs and their new, all-white school districts, while urban 
districts were taken to court to accomplish the promise of Brown." Kushner, Second, 
supra note 165, at 1065. 
171. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). By "limit[ing] urban school remedies to 
the urban district absent a finding of a violation by the suburban districts, [Milliken] 
insulated the white suburbs from busing and further encouraged the establishment of 
separate societies." Kushner, Second, supra note 165, at 1065. 
172. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973); Kushner, Second, 
supra note 165, at 1065 n.61 ("In refusing to equalize district school funding in 
[Rodriguez], ... the Burger Court approved of racially 'separate and unequal' schools, 
and thus neighborhoods, in a cruel and ironic play on the discredited Plessy 
doctrine.") (citation omitted). 
173. Kushner, Second, supra note 165, at 1064. 
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A very brief time line of the regulatory history of the financial 
market would include, among other things, the following pieces of 
legislation: 
1863: The National Bank Actl74 (established the Office of 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC»;175 
1913: The Federal Reserve Act l76 (established the Federal 
Reserve System (FRS»; 
1933: The Banking Act, a.k.a., the Glass-Steagall Act177 
(established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 
supervised state banks not otherwise under federal regulation, 
extended federal supervision to all commercial banks, and 
separated commercial from investment banking); 178 
1933: The Securities Act l79 (established a federal disclosure 
regime for companies seeking to issue stocks for sale to the 
general public); 180 
1934: The Securities Exchange Act l81 (established the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and implemented 
requirements for companies to file registration statements in 
conjunction with initial public offerings and annual 
disclosures); 182 
174. National Bank Act, ch. 106, § 5,13 Stat. 99-100 (1864) (codified as amended at 12 
U.S.C. §§ 21-21a (2006)). 
175. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-216, FINANCIAL REGULATION: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO MODERNIZE THE 
OUTDATED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM 6 fig.1 (2009); National Bank Act, 
ch. 106, § 5, 13 Stat. 99-100 (1864) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § I (2006)). 
176. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 1,38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
177. The Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89,48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.c. §§ 
1811-1832 (2006)). 
178. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 175, at 7 fig.l; Damon Silvers & 
Heather Slavkin, The Legacy of Deregulation and the Financial Crisis-Linkages 
Between Deregulation in Labor Markets, Housing Finance Markets, and the Broader 
Financial Markets, 4 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 301, 317 n.77 (2009). 
179. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 148 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
77a-77aa (2006)). 
180. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 175, at 7 fig.l; Silvers & Slavkin, 
supra note 178, at 317 n. 77. 
181. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2006). 
182. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 175, at 7 fig.l; Silvers & Slavkin, 
supra note 178, at 317 n.77. 
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1934: The National Housing Act183 (established the Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) to insure 
deposits of savings and loans; also established the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA), which provided mortgage 
insurance to protect private lenders from losses associated with 
foreclosures on insured mortgages); 184 
1989: The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act185 (reformed, recapitalized, and consolidated 
the Federal deposit insurance system; enhanced the regulatory 
and enforcement powers of regulatory agencies responsible for 
Federal financial institutions; established the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS); FDIC absorbed FSLIC; Federal Housing 
Finance Board (FHFB) replaced FHLBB);186 
2000: The Commodity Futures Modernization Act187 
(established principles-based structure for regulating futures 
exchanges and derivates clearing organizations; clarified that 
some off-exchange trading would be permitted and remain 
largely unregulated); 188 and 
2002: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act189 (improved accuracy and 
reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to securities 
laws; established the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB).190 
The regulatory history, of course, does not take into account either 
the history of deregulation of the financial market or the extent of 
183. National Housing Act, ch. 847,48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
184. U.S. GOy'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 175, at 7 fig.l; Silvers & Slavkin, 
supra note 178, at 316 n.76; id. at 319. 
185. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 18, & 31 
U.S.c.). 
186. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 175, at 7 fig.l; Financial Institutions 
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, pmbl., 103 
Stat. 183; id. § 101, 103 Stat. at 187; id. § 401(a)(I), 103 Stat. at 354, § 401(e)(I), 103 
Stat. at 356; id. § 702(a)(2A)(a)(I), 103 Stat. at 413. 
187. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 
A-365 app. E (codified as amended in scattered sections of7, 11, 12 & 15 U.S.C.). 
188. U.S. GOy'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 175, at 7 fig.l; Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of2000, sec. 108, § 3 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 5 (2006)). 
189. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 & 18 U.S.C.). 
190. U.S. GOy'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 175, at 7 fig.l; Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
pmbl.; id. § 10 1 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 7211 (2006)). 
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federal and state agency involvement in that market. A similarly 
brief history of deregulation would read like this: In 1980, the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Ad91 
was enacted, which preempted state imposed interest rate caps. 192 
Then, in 1982, Congress passed the Garn-St. Germain Act,193 which 
allowed thrifts to expand beyond mortgage lending into commercial 
lending, credit cards, and real estate investing,194 and the Alternative 
Mortgage Transactions Parity Act,195 which relaxed restrictions on 
lenders' ability to offer adjustable rate mortgages. l96 In 1996, the 
National Securities Markets Improvement Ace97 preempted most 
state oversight of nationally traded securities. 198 Finally, in 1999, 
Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,199 which repealed the 
Glass-Steagall Act and eliminated restrictions on banks, securities 
firms, and insurance companies from affiliating with each other. 200 
Ironically, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is the piece of federal 
legislation that enabled Citicorp to merge with Travelers Group in 
1998 to form Citigroup.201 In other words, Citigroup, the parent 
company of CitiMortgage, exists only because the laws of the United 
States allowed it to spring into existence in 1998. Citigroup itself is 
therefore a state-created legal construct, just like the markets in 
which it actively participates. 
As for the extent of federal and state agency involvement in the 
regulation of the financial market, suffice it to say that every financial 
institution has a primary federal regulator and a secondary state 
regulator. For example, national banks are primarily regulated on the 
191. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. 
No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.s.c.). 
192. Silvers & Slavkin, supra note 178, at 320. 
193. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 
1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
194. Silvers & Slavkin, supra note 178, at 320. 
195. Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 
1545 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-05 (2006». 
196. Silvers & Slavkin, supra note 178, at 321. 
197. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 
3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
198. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 175, at 7 fig.l; National Securities 
Markets Improvement Act, pmbl., § 102. 
199. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.). 
200. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 175, at 7 fig. I ; Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act, pmbl. 
201. See Lissa Lamkin Broome & Jerry W. Markham, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: An 
Overview, I (2001), available at http://www.symtrex.comJpdfdocs/glb---'paper.pdf. 
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federal side by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currencl02 and, 
in California, by the Department of Financial Institutions.203 The 
point of noting agency involvement is not to catalogue the specific 
regulations issued by the federal and state regulators listed but rather 
to further undermine the modem contract law assumption that the 
market is self-regulating and largely outside of state control. 
As the brief histories of regulation, deregulation, and agency 
involvement in the financial market demonstrate, a market is 
inseparable from the laws that create it. Consequently, the modern 
contract law assumption that markets are self-regulating and largely 
outside of state control is simply untenable. 
2. Contracts Are Not Voluntary 
One of the hallmarks of contract law is the notion that contracts 
are voluntary.204 This notion of voluntariness is what ostensibly 
separates contracts from other areas of "public" law, like tortS. 205 
Contracts, however, are not voluntary in any way that matters. 
The Legal Realists argued persuasively that contracts were not the 
product of voluntary assent between two private parties, but were 
instead the result of coercion.206 To the Realists, coercion was 
ubiquitous and "at the heart of every bargain.,,207 This was because 
202. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency "charters, regulates, and supervises all 
national banks." About the acc, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-do/missionlindex-about.html (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2011). 
203. According to its website, the California Department of Financial Institutions is the 
state regulator responsible for overseeing "California's state-chartered financial 
institutions." CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, 
http://www.dfi.ca.gov (last visited August 30, 2011). As such, DFI is "responsible for 
administering state laws regulating: banks, credit unions, industrial banks, trust 
companies, offices of foreign banks, money transmitters, issuers of travelers checks 
and payment instruments/money orders, and premium finance companies." Id. 
204. See supra text accompanying notes 50, 59 (discussing the modem contract law 
assumption that contracts are voluntary). 
205. See supra note 51 (discussing the public part of the public-private distinction). 
206. See generally Hale, Coercion, supra note 145, at 470; Hale, Duress, supra note 141, 
at 606. There is, of course, more recent scholarship on coercion. See, e.g., PIERRE 
BORDIEU, THE SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF THE ECONOMY (Chris Tumer trans. 2005). A 
more thorough and nuanced analysis of coercion in contract law is, therefore, possible 
but beyond the scope of this article. I plan to undertake this analysis in another paper 
currently entitled, Contracts, Coercion & The American Dream. 
207. Elizabeth Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REv. 753, 764 
(1981) [hereinafter Mensch, Ideology]. 
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mutual coercion exists in every contrace08 for the simple reason that 
each party is entitled by law to withhold from the other his capital, 
labor, money, or anything else that he owns. 209 Coercion, therefore, 
is a function of ownership, which, in tum, is a function of legal 
entitlements because it was and is the state that creates and protects 
property rights.21O Not surprisingly, the more one party owns (in 
terms of quantity or value), the more potent that party's threat to 
withhold becomes.2l1 Accordingly, coercion exists whenever a party 
assents to a contract to avoid the consequences with which the other 
threatens him.212 Robert Hale explained this idea in 1943: 
In the complex bargains made in the course of production, 
some parties who deal with the manufacturer surrender a 
portion of their property, others their liberty not to work for 
him, in order to avoid his threat to withhold his money, 
while he, in tum, surrenders some part of the money he now 
owns, . .. to avert their threats of withholding from him 
their raw materials or their labor. . .. In consenting to enter 
into any bargain, each party yields to the threats of the 
other. 213 
208. Mutual coercion literally encompasses the idea that each party to a contract coerces 
the other. See, e.g., Hale, Coercion, supra note 145, at 474 (discussing how 
customers and workers can weaken the owner's coercive power, in the case of 
customers, "through their law-given power to withhold access to their cash, the 
laborers through their actual power . . . to withhold their services"); Edwin W. 
Patterson, Compulsory Contracts in the Crystal Ball, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 731, 741-42 
(1943) (discussing refusal to give consideration unless the promisor makes a return 
promise); Hale, Duress, supra note 141, at 604, 606, 626 (discussing other examples 
of mutual coercion). For more recent work acknowledging that mutual coercion 
exists in every contract, see Barnhizer, Inequality, supra note 15, at 163-65. 
209. See generally Cohen, Property, supra note 141; Hale, Coercion, supra note 145; 
Mensch, Ideology supra note 207, at 764; Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 486. 
210. Cohen, Property, supra note 141, at 11-14; Hale, Coercion, supra note 145, at 471-
74; Mensch, History, supra note 35, at 34-35; Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 487-
88. 
211. Cohen, Property, supra note 141, at 11-13; Hale, Coercion, supra note 145, at 471-
73; Hale, Duress, supra note 141, at 627; Mensch, Ideology supra note 207, at 764; 
Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 486. The more one party owns has other important 
implications beyond just making that party's threat to withhold more potent. See 
supra text accompanying notes 146-52 (discussing bargaining power and how much 
one is allowed to acquire). 
212. See, e.g., Hale, Duress, supra note 141, at 604,606. 
213. Id. at 606; see also Cohen, Property, supra note 141, at 12 ("If ... somebody ... 
wants to use [property] which the law calls mine, he has to get my consent. To the 
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Thus, in the context of the home mortgage loan between 
CitiMortgage and Mary Smith, Mary Smith surrendered a portion of 
her property (i.e., property rights in the house she purchased via the 
mortgage and in her money when she agreed to repay the principal 
plus interest) to avoid CitiMortgage's threat to withhold the money 
she needed to purchase the house. Similarly, CitiMortgage 
surrendered some of the money it owned to avert Mary Smith's threat 
of withholding from it some of her property rights. 
The sine qua non of coercion is simply that a threat induces the 
parties to enter the contract.214 Such threats exist in the hypothetical 
CitiMortgage-Mary Smith loan transaction. Thus, in this way, the 
home mortgage loan (i.e., the contract) between Mary Smith and 
CitiMortgage is coerced. 
A distinction can be drawn between the contract (i.e., the home 
mortgage loan) and Mary Smith's decision to purchase a house. It 
would be easy enough to limit the coercion argument to just the 
contract, since the basic point of this section is that all contracts are 
coerced, not voluntary. The fact that Mary Smith could have rented a 
place to live, rather than bought one, however, might seem to 
undercut the coercion argument being made here. The specific 
objection goes like this: Mary Smith could have chosen to rent a 
house, rather than buy one, which therefore shows that her decision 
to purchase her home was not coerced. In other words, because 
another option existed for Ms. Smith (i.e., to rent), she could not have 
been coerced into the choice she made to buy her house. This 
objection, however, is misplaced. 
To begin with, coercion does not require an absence of choice.215 
That is, the existence of choice does not disprove the existence of 
coercion, because the essence of the latter is that it requires a party to 
extent that these things are necessary to the life of my neighbor, the law thus confers 
on me a power, limited but real, to make him do what I want."). 
214. See, e.g., Hale, Duress, supra note 141, at 604,606. 
215. See Dawson, supra note 101, at 266--67 (arguing that the courts in various types of 
duress situations were confused and misguided in thinking that volition had to be 
overcome before duress could be found). Dawson wrote that "courts had been slow to 
realize that the instances of more extreme pressure were precisely those in which the 
consent [(i.e., the existence of choice),] was more real; the more unpleasant the 
alternative, the more real the consent to a course which would avoid it." Prof 
Patterson specifically asks whether "compulsion negate[s] 'freedom of consent' and 
thus negate[s] consent," and answers the question in the negative. Patterson, supra 
note 208, at 741. He states that, "[e]ven non-permissible pressure ... does not negate 
consent." Jd. 742. For additional material discussing this point, see Hale, Duress, 
supra note 141, at 606. 
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choose the lesser of two evils.216 A person will therefore choose to 
enter into a particular transaction to avoid the threat of something 
worse.217 
Perhaps more importantly, the fact that someone exercised a 
choice does not indicate a lack of compulsion.2\8 This is because a 
person's freedom to decline to enter into a particular transaction is 
circumscribed by the way society, at least in the United States, has 
been set up.219 Society is premised on property rights,220 which are 
bestowed by the state.221 Property rights are not bestowed equally.222 
One cannot use an owner's property without the owner's consene23 
because the state will enforce the owner's right to keep other people's 
hands off of his things.224 So if a person owns enough property or the 
right kind of property so that she has a place to live, for example, 
then she does not have to worry about finding shelter.225 She can 
provide it for herself. If, however, a person does not own the right 
kind of property, she has to get an owner's consent to use his 
property. 226 And an owner will not give his consent unless he is 
216. Hale, Duress, supra note 141, at 618 (discussing Justice Holmes's opinion in Union 
Pac. R.R. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67, 70 (1918)). 
217. ld at 605--06. 
218. Jd. at 606. 
219. Hale, Coercion, supra note 145, at 470; Hale, Duress, supra note 141. 
220. See generally Cohen, Property, supra note 141, at 11-14. 
221. Jd. 
222. See supra text accompanying notes 148-52,208-13. Recall also that one's property 
rights determines one's bargaining power in the market and, therefore, the amount one 
will ultimately be allowed to acquire. See supra text accompanying notes 148-52. 
223. Cohen, Property, supra note 141, at 12 ("If then somebody else wants to use 
[property] which the law calls mine, he has to get my consent. To the extent that 
these things are necessary to the life of my neighbor, the law thus confers on me a 
power, limited but real, to make him do what I want."); Hale, Coercion, supra note 
145, at 471 ("What is the government doing when it 'protects a property right'? 
Passively, it is abstaining from interference with the owner when he deals with the 
thing owned; actively, it is forcing the non-owner to desist from handling it, unless the 
owner consents."). 
224. See Hale, Duress, supra note 141, at 604 ("The owner of the shoes or the food or any 
other product can insist on other people keeping their hands off his products. Should 
he so insist, the government will back him up with force."). See generally Cohen, 
Property, supra note 141, at 11-14. 
225. Of course, more is at stake with property ownership than merely not having to worry 
about housing. According to Morris Cohen, "[i]n a regime where [property] is the 
principal source of obtaining a livelihood, he who has the legal right over the 
[property] receives homage and service from those who wish to [make use of] it." 
Cohen, Property, supra note 141, at 12. 
226. ld. 
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paid.227 Consequently, without property of one's own and absent an 
owner's consent, a person will have to go without whatever it is, in 
this instance, a place to live. Hence, in reality, one's "choice" to pay 
an owner for use of his property is really an effort to avoid the threat 
of something worse, which is the essence of coercion-having to 
choose the lesser of two evils.228 
In the context of the CitiMortgage-Mary Smith hypothetical, 
Mary Smith had to decide whether to purchase a home. Her decision 
really came down to a decision to go without shelter (and be 
homeless), submit to the threat of some other owner (either to rent or 
buy the other owner's property),229 or submit to the threat of the 
owner whose house she was interested in. It seems pretty clear that 
the consequences of being homeless are much worse than the 
consequences of paying an owner to use his property, otherwise 
people would not pay owners for a place to live.230 Thus, if Mary 
Smith had chosen to rent rather than be homeless, her decision to rent 
would have been coerced-she chose the lesser of two evils to avoid 
the threat of being homeless. 
In deciding whether to rent or buy a home, Mary Smith was 
essentially confronted with a choice of threats-pay an owner what 
he wants for his property or go without a place to live. But either 
way, Smith was confronted with a threat. The only question is which 
option (renting or buying) presents the lesser evil? Given that home 
227. Hale, Duress, supra note 141, at 604 ("Any person, in order to live, must induce some 
of the owners of things which he needs, to permit him to use them. The owner has no 
legal obligation to grant the permission. But if offered enough money he will 
probably do so; for he, too, must obtain the permission of other owners to make use of 
their goods, and for this purpose he too needs money .... "); see also Cohen, 
Property, supra note 141, at 13. 
228. Hale, Duress, supra note 141, at 618 (discussing Justice Holmes's opinion in Union 
Pac. R.R. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67, 70 (1918». 
229. Threats exist in this other context for the same reason that there was mutual coercion 
and, therefore, mutual threats in the context of the CitiMortgage-Mary Smith home 
mortgage loan. If Mary Smith had to deal and ultimately contract with another owner 
for a place to rent or buy, that owner would essentially be threatening to withhold his 
property unless Mary Smith paid him what he wanted for its use. See supra text 
accompanying notes 208-26 (discussing the mutual coercion in the CitiMortgage-
Mary Smith loan). 
230. See Hale, Coercion, supra note 145, at 472 ("[T]he consequence of abstaining from a 
particular bag of peanuts would be, either to go without such nutriment altogether ... 
, or to conform to the terms of some other owner. Presumably at least one of these 
consequences would be as bad as the loss of the five cents [for the bag of peanuts], or 
the purchaser would not buy .... "). 
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ownership is set up to be the more attractive option,231 the choice 
representing the lesser of the two evils is the decision to buy. Mary 
Smith's decision to buy her home, therefore, was itself coerced. 
Consequently, the fact that Ms. Smith chose to buy a home does 
not in any way eliminate the coercion that exists in her home 
mortgage contract with CitiMortgage. Instead, it demonstrates that 
context matters, contracts are not entered into in a vacuum, and 
coercion is broad and pervasive in contracts.232 
But just because coercion is involved in the making of every 
contract is not to say that there is a problem with every contract or 
even that every contract is in need of a remedy. 233 It is to say, 
231. For example, homeownership is one of the primary ways to build personal wealth 
through the equity that accumulates in property over time, which, in turn, enables the 
homeowner to fund education and other things. See, e.g., Dana L. Kaersvang, Book 
Note, The Fair Housing Act and Disparate Impact in Homeowners Insurance, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 1993, 1994 (2006); Rick Santorum, Wealth Creation in the New 
Millennium: Transforming Poverty in America, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL'y 383, 391 (2002). Homeowners also enjoy tax incentives not available to 
renters. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163(3) (2006) (permitting deduction for home mortgage 
and home equity interest payments); I.R.C. § I 64(a)(I) (permitting deduction for state 
and local real property taxes); Kenya Covington & Rodney Harrell, From Renting to 
Homeownership: Using Tax Incentives to Encourage Homeownership Among 
Renters, 44 HARV. 1. ON LEGIS. 97, 106 (2007) (discussing specific tax benefits 
enjoyed by homeowners vis-a-vis renters); Mark Andrew Snider, The Suburban 
Advantage: Are the Tax Benefits of Homeownership Defensible?, 32 N. Ky. L. REv. 
157, 157-58 (2005) (noting that tax benefits are available to homeowners, not 
renters). 
232. I am very mindful of the potential risk involved in claiming that every contract is 
coerced, namely, that this may lead to trivialization of the phenomenon (as simply a 
fact of life) instead of a more serious consideration of it. Part of the problem stems 
from the negative connotation associated with the term "coercion." See Hale, 
Coercion, supra note 145, at 474-75. I also recognize that coercion occurs on a 
spectrum, with the CitiMortgage-Mary Smith hypothetical representing a more 
coercive situation than, say, a person stopping to buy a candy bar at a convenience 
store on a road trip. See infra text accompanying notes 337-54 (discussing the candy 
bar hypothetical). I am certainly not trying to trivialize coercion in contracting by 
claiming that all contracts are coerced. I am, however, making a very pointed 
argument that contracts are not voluntary in ways that matter. More than this, I am 
also suggesting a possible paradigm shift away from a view of contracts as a voluntary 
transaction to one premised on coercion. See Danielle Kie Hart, Contracts, Coercion 
& The American Dream (working paper) (on file with author). 
233. Hale, Coercion, supra note 145, at 471 ("[T]o call an act coercive is not by any means 
to condemn it."); id at 474-78 (discussing the nature of coercion); Patterson, supra 
note 208, at 742 ("[A] line must be drawn, not between pressure and no pressure, but 
between permissible and non-permissible pressure."); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 cmt. a (1981) ("[Implied] threats are an accepted part 
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however, that contracts are not voluntary, notwithstanding modem 
contract law's claim to the contrary. 
3. Contracts Are Public, Not Private 
According to modem contract law, contracts are private?34 But 
here again, modern contract law is mistaken. Contracts are public for 
two related reasons. 
First, contract law does not enforce every promise a person makes. 
It only enforces some of them. 235 Through its courts, legislatures, and 
agencies, the state determines which contracts will be enforced.236 
This determination necessarily requires courts and legislatures to 
make policy choices between competing principles and values, such 
as freedom and security.237 These policy choices are matters of 
public concern. Here, the state (through its contract law and 
regulation, or lack of regulation, of the residential housing market) 
has made a public policy choice that subprime loans, like the one 
between CitiMortgage and Mary Smith in the hypothetical, are 
enforceable.238 Once it is acknowledged that the decision about 
of the bargaining process. A threat does not amount to duress unless it is so improper 
as to amount to an abuse of that process."). 
234. See supra text accompanying notes 51, 56. 
235. Cohen, Contract, supra note 32, at 585; Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 485. Once 
the state (through its judges and legislators) determines which contracts are 
enforceable, the state will then enforce those state created contract rights by literally 
putting the sovereign power of the state in the service of one contracting party against 
the other. It accomplishes this by compelling one of the parties (through its judges, 
sheriffs, and other state agents) to either payor perform. 
236. Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 485. See generally Cohen, Contract, supra note 32, 
at 562, 585-92. 
237. See Feinman, Critical, supra note 58, at 841--42; Mensch, Ideology, supra note 207, at 
759; Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 484-85. See generally Cohen, Contracts, 
supra note 32. 
238. See Phillips v. Mortg. E1ec. Registration Sys., No. 1:09-CV-OI028-0WW-SMS, 2009 
WL 3233865, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2009) (granting lender's motion to dismiss 
plaintiff's complaint with prejudice); Rangel v. DHI Mortg. Co., No. CV F 09-1035 
LJO GSA, 2009 WL 2190210, at *1, *3--4, *12 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2009) (granting 
lender's motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint with prejudice); City of Cleveland v. 
Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc. 621 F. Supp. 2d 513,530-31 (N.D. Ohio 2009), affd, 
615 F.3d 496, 505-07 (6th Cir. 2010) ("There [was] no question that the subprime 
lending that occurred in Cleveland was conduct which 'the law sanctions,' and as 
such, it [could not] be a public nuisance."); Rogers v. Am. Brokers Conduit, No. 2:09-
CV-715 TS, 2009 WL 3584323, at *3 (D. Utah Oct. 26, 2009) (granting lender's 
motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint). The plaintiffs' complaints in all three cases 
included, among other things, claims for suitability, negligence, breach of fiduciary 
duty, negligent and intentional misrepresentation, breach of implied covenant of good 
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contract enforceability comes down to a policy choice, nothing 
separates private law from public politics.239 
Second, specifically because the subprime loan in the hypothetical 
is legally enforceable, the state (through its judges, sheriffs, and other 
state agents) will step in to enforce the obligations contained in that 
contract by compelling Mary Smith, the borrower, to either pay to get 
out of it, perform it, or file bankruptcy as a result of it. 240 Thus, 
because the state decides whether a given type of contract is 
faith, unfair lending practices, and wrongful foreclosure. See generally STAFF OF S. 
COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, Predatory Lending Practices: 
Staff Analysis of Regulators' Responses, 54 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REp. 228, 230-31 
(2000) (specifically noting distinction between illegitimate predatory lending 
practices, and legitimate and legal subprime lending). 
239. All law is politics is, of course, one of the main critiques leveled by the Critical Legal 
Studies movement against law in general. In brief, CLS scholars argued that all law is 
politics, because the discourses of law and politics are essentially the same. Cf 
Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 
YALE LJ. 1,60 (1984) [hereinafter Singer, Player]. That is, every argument that can 
be made in the legislative arena can be, and usually is, also made in court. See, e.g., 
Robert Mangaberia Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 
561, 565 (1983). Law, therefore, is really just an elaborate political ideology. 
Feinman, Critical, supra note 58, at 852. A good example of the "all law is politics" 
point is the different treatment given surrogacy contracts in different states. Compare, 
e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (2011) (prohibiting surrogate parenting 
contracts), and Itskov v. N.Y. Fertility Inst., Inc., 813 N.Y.S.2d 844, 845 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2006) (holding surrogate parenting agreement unenforceable as against public 
policy), with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 2011) (surrogate contracts 
enforceable), and J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740, 741 (Ohio 2007) (holding gestational-
surrogacy contract did not violate public policy of Ohio and was enforceable). 
240. See Cohen, Contract, supra note 32, at 585-86; Singer, Realism. supra note 35, at 
483. Ms. Smith could lack the financial resources to payor perform her contract with 
CitiMortgage or to file bankruptcy to discharge her obligations under it. In that case, 
Ms. Smith would simply have to wait for CitiMortgage to declare a default and sue to 
foreclose on the mortgage. CitiMortgage would also sue for any deficiency resulting 
from the foreclosure sale of Ms. Smith's house. This deficiency judgment would then 
enable CitiMortgage to garnish some of Ms. Smith's wages and seize any other assets 
Ms. Smith might own now or in the future, until the deficiency judgment is paid in 
full. In essence, if Ms. Smith ends up doing nothing, because she lacks the financial 
resources to act, she will end up being forced to pay to get out of her contract with 
CitiMortgage. One could also argue that Ms. Smith would be forced to perform her 
contract, because her performance obligation to CitiMortgage consists of paying the 
amounts specified in the contract. In either event, and specifically because she 
entered into a binding contract with CitiMortgage, the state would end up forcing Ms. 
Smith to either pay to get out of her contract or perform it. 
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enforceable241 and will actually enforce those contracts, contracts are 
public, not private. 
4. The State's Role is Neither Neutral Nor Minimal and, Therefore, 
Contracts Are Not Just Between Two Private Parties 
As previously shown, the state constructs the market. 242 
Notwithstanding this evidence, one of the biggest myths that the 
modem contract law system adheres to is that the role of the state is 
neutral and minimal.243 The state's role is neither because, in 
addition to fabricating the market, the state also determines 
everyone's legal entitlements in the form of property rights, which 
then directly impact each person's ability to contract,244 and 
ultimately decides which contracts will be enforceable. 245 Clearly, 
therefore, the state plays an active role in every contract, and, as a 
result, its role is neither neutral nor minimal. 246 Indeed, and as shown 
by the state's active role in the subprime loan contract between 
CitiMortgage and Mary Smith, it is impossible to say that contracts 
are just between private parties?47 The state is as much a party to 
each contract as the contracting parties themselves. 
5. Individuals Do Not Act Rationally in the Marketplace, Nor Are 
Contracts the Product of Informed Choice 
To understand the critique of modem contract law's rational-actor 
assumption,248 one must first know something about a "rational 
actor." A basic version of the rational actor looks like this: A person 
acts rationally where she perfectly processes available information 
about alternative courses of action and then ranks the possible 
outcomes in the order of expected utility. 249 Expected utility is 
241. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1948) (holding that when courts 
enforce racially restrictive covenants in real property contracts, they are engaged in 
state action, that is, using state power). 
242. See supra Part II.A.I. 
243. See supra text accompanying note 63. 
244. See supra text accompanying notes 146-53,200-05. 
245. See supra Part ILA.3. 
246. See Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 482; Cohen, Property, supra note 141, at 12. 
247. This is, of course, yet another assumption of modem contract law that cannot be 
sustained. See supra text accompanying note 56 (laying out the assumption). 
248. See supra text accompanying note 58. 
249. Game theory ultimately led to a series of "decisionmaking principles or axioms that 
rational actors were expected to honor." Hanson & Kysar, supra note 113, at 64l. 
According to Hanson & Kysar, "[t]he ultimate conclusion to be derived from these 
axioms of decisionmaking is that players will act in the manner that maximizes their 
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usually defined in tenns of the person's "self-interest."25o Self-
interest, in turn, is commonly assumed to be wealth-maximization.251 
So, modern contract law's rational actor will end up ranking all of the 
possible outcomes, based on all the infonnation provided her, in the 
order in which they maximize her wealth. To be a rational actor 
therefore presupposes that one will not only have access to the 
infonnation relevant to one's decision but will also be able to 
understand it and make effective use of it.252 Unfortunately, none of 
this is true in general and not when it comes, more particularly, to 
contracts.253 
expected utility." Id. at 642. "Rational behavior," as a result, soon became 
synonymous with expected utility. Id. 
The economists' model, in its purest form, is based on elegantly 
simple propositions about both cognitive capacities and 
motivations. The model assumes that a person can perfectly 
process available information about alternative courses of action, 
and can rank possible outcomes in order of expected utility. The 
model also assumes that an actor will choose the course of action 
that will maximize expected utility .... 
Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A 
Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 23, 23 (1989); see 
also Hadfield, supra note 56, at 1254; Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law 
and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and 
Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1062 (2000) (noting that "expected utility 
theory" is the most dominant conception of rational choice theory in modem 
microeconomics); Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes 
on the New Behavioral Law and Economics Movement, 34 LAW & SOC'y REV. 973, 
977 (2000); Willis, supra note 26, at 741. 
250. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 249, at 1064 (discussing a "thicker" version of the 
rational actor theory in which the actor's own goals and preferences are added to 
"expected utility theory's predictions about the manner in which actors will attempt to 
achieve their utility"; according to the authors, the most common assumption is "that 
actors will seek to maximize what is in their self-interest"); Willis, supra note 26, at 
741 ("The thicker versions of rational choice theory would add that consumers' 
marketplace decisions reflect their own financial self-interest."). 
251. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 249, at 1066 ("The thickest conceptions of rational 
choice theory provide ... more specific predictions about the ends of decision makers 
than does the self-interest version. The most common of these very thick conceptions 
is 'wealth maximization': the prediction that actors will attempt to maximize their 
financial well-being or monetary situation. "); Rostain, supra note 249, at 977. 
252. See Willis, supra note 26, at 741-42. 
253. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 94, at 705 ("[MJandated disclosure rests on 
false assumptions: that people want to make all the consequential decisions about their 
lives, and that they want to do so by assembling all the relevant information, 
reviewing all possible outcomes, reviewing all their relevant values, and deciding 
which choice best promotes their preferences."). 
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Studies show, for example, that common form-contract language 
is understandable only by people with college degrees/54 a group that 
does not comprise many contracting parties,255 particularly 
consumers.256 In addition, basic microeconomics continues to 
confirm that market failures in the form of information asymmetries 
remain fairly common/57 obtaining information imposes costS/58 and 
parties do not have equal access to information.259 
Of course, even if parties did have equal access to information, 
behavioral law and economics tells us that individuals do not 
consider all of the "salient" information,260 where salience can be 
defined as prominent information that individuals actually pay 
attention to in making their rational contractual decisions. 261 What 
254. ld. at 712 ("[D]isclosures are chronically hard to read. Financial-privacy notices are 
written, on average, at a third- or fourth-year college reading level."). 
255. According to Ben-Shahar & Schneider, "over 40 million adults are functionally 
illiterate, 'and another 50 million have marginal literacy skills.'" Jd. at 711 (quoting 
Ad Hoc Comm. On Health Literacy for the Council Council on Scientific Affairs, 
Am. Med. Ass'n, Health Literacy: Report of the Council on Scientific Affairs, 281 
JAMA 552, 552 (1999)). Significantly, "[r]ates of innumeracy are even worse than 
rates of illiteracy." ld. at 712. 
256. See id. at 712 ("[O]nly 3% to 4% of the population can understand the language in 
which contracts are drafted."); Garvin, supra note 114, at 310-11 & n.62 (discussing 
the different studies). 
257. Rubin, supra note 114, at 1909-10 (noting that market failure in the form of 
information asymmetry occurs fairly frequently). 
258. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 27, at 13; Garvin, supra note 114, at 308 
("As Herbert Simon has observed, both information and its assimilation are costly, so 
we must make decisions based on incomplete information."); Rubin, supra note 114, 
at 1910 ("Even if the consumer is entirely rational, the opportunity cost of 
obtaining ... information may exceed the advantage of doing so, which means that 
there is no way for the consumer to remedy the asymmetry efficiently."). 
259. See, e.g., KAPLOw & SHAVELL, supra note 113, at 36 ("It is a commonplace that 
consumer information is often imperfect .... "). 
260. Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking & the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of 
Predatory Lending 19-20 (Loyola Law Sch., L.A., Working Paper No.2, 2005) 
("[M]ost people use only four or five salient decision attributes in making complex 
decisions; beyond that number, decisionrnaking [sic] quality goes down. When under 
stress, people reduce the number of attributes under consideration even more 
radically, to fewer attributes.") (footnote omitted). 
261. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1206 (2003). Cj Whitford, Disclosure, 
supra note 102, at 424 ("In a rough layman's sense, it might be said that disclosure 
regulation typically pertains to a cluster of considerations that need to be weighed in 
determining the 'best buy' for one's money."). 
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infonnation is salient, therefore, will vary depending on the 
contractual context.262 
Behavioral law and economics also tells us that individuals do not 
act rationally in the marketplace for many reasons.263 I will touch on 
two. First, people are "boundedly rational," which simply refers to 
the fact that human cognitive abilities are limited.264 What this means 
is that human beings end up taking mental short cuts to help them 
make reasonably good decisions that provide them with more or less 
acceptable results, but results that may not necessarily maximize their 
wealth.265 Second, people's preferences are affected by the context in 
which the infonnation is presented.266 Studies have shown, for 
example, that test subjects will change their preferences based solely 
on the way in which the options are presented to them. 267 The 
obvious result is that the party in position to frame the choice can 
alter the decision ultimately made, notwithstanding the test subject's 
expected utility or desire for wealth maximization.268 
But what does all of this mean in the context of the hypothetical 
subprime loan transaction between CitiMortgage and Mary Smith? 
The hypothetical made clear that TILA and RESP A were complied 
with, and, therefore, no statutory violation occurred.269 
Practically speaking, this means that CitiMortgage gave Ms. Smith 
her initial RESPA disclosures (the good faith estimates) three days 
after receiving her loan270 and her final TILA and RESP A disclosures 
at loan closing.271 Practically speaking, this also means that Ms. 
Smith probably did not read the disclosures, let alone the loan 
documents.272 Even if she did read them, she, like most consumers, 
262. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 261, at 1225-44. 
263. See generally Garvin, supra note 114, at 302-25; Korobkin, supra note 261, at 1206, 
1208-16. 
264. See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 83, at 1477. 
265. Garvin, supra note 114, at 308-09; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 249, at 1143. 
266. Rostain, supra note 249, at 978 ("People's preferences ... are shaped by the very 
process by which they are elicited."). This is what the behavioral law and economics 
literature refers to as "framing effects." ld. 
267. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 113, at 644 (discussing the work and studies of Tversky 
and Kahneman); Rostain, supra note 249, at 978 ("[E]xperimental evidence 
establishes that preferences depend importantly on how choices are described."). 
268. See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 113, at 685; Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra 
note 83, at 1534. 
269. See supra text accompanying notes 16-30. 
270. Willis, supra note 26, at 745. 
271. Jd. at 747. 
272. Cj Ben-Shahar, Myth, supra note 131, at 2 ("Real people don't read standard form 
contracts."). 
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probably would not have understood them273 because the disclosures 
are extremely complicated.274 And, because she didn't understand 
them, Ms. Smith would have been unable to shop for better terms.275 
In addition, the loan documents would have been framed in a way 
that downplayed the risks of the loan;276 the only salient piece of 
information Ms. Smith probably focused on was the monthly 
payment;277 and Ms. Smith probably took mental short cuts to help 
her make her decision, like discounting the likelihood that adverse 
events, such as an upward adjustment to her adjustable rate mortgage 
and prepayment penalties, might occur in the future.278 
273. See generally Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 27, at 29 ("A recent FTC survey found 
that many consumers do not understand, or even identify, key mortgage tenns.") 
Willis, supra note 26, at 751-54 (discussing consumers' financial illiteracy); id. at 
763-64 (arguing that financial illiteracy is a bigger problem for sUbprime loan 
borrowers). 
274. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 27, at 27-32 (citing a survey by the Center for 
American Progress and the Center for Responsible Lending, which found that 38% of 
consumers found mortgage loans too complicated to understand, and this finding was 
confinned by a 2006 study by the United States Government Accountability Office 
and other studies as well); Willis, supra note 26, at 752 ("The disclosures are not 
presented in simple enough lay terms and many borrowers ignore the disclosures as 
incomprehensible legally mandated gobbledygook."). See generally Bar-Gill, supra 
note 16, at 1102-06. 
275. See Willis, supra note 26, at 749-54; cf Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 27, at 31 
("Consumers who lack information about the basic operation of credit products, who 
do not understand annual percentage rates, or who do not know that they have been 
charged substantial fees, cannot make effective comparisons among products."). 
276. See Willis, supra note 26, at 785-88; cf Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 27, at 53-54 
(noting that mortgage products defer a lot of the loan's actual costs into the future and 
the disaggregation offees in mortgage loans). 
277. Willis, supra note 26, at 780,788; cf Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 27, at 29 (citing 
an FTC survey that found that "many consumers do not understand, or even identify, 
key mortgage terms"). 
278. Willis, supra note 26, at 776-79. Indeed, Professor Bar-Gill notes that 
[iJmperfectly rational borrowers will not be able to effectively 
aggregate multiple price and nonprice dimensions and discern 
from them the true total cost of the mortgage product. Inevitably, 
these borrowers will focus on a few salient dimensions. If 
borrowers cannot process complex, multidimensional contracts 
and thus ignore less salient price dimensions, then lenders will 
offer complex, multidimensional contracts, shifting much of the 
loan's cost to the less salient dimensions. 
Bar-Gill, supra note 16, at 1079. 
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In short, people simply do not rank their preferences based on 
their expected net utility, because they can't.279 In other words, 
people do not act rationally in the market in the ways that modem 
contract law presupposes that they do. 280 As a result, contracts are 
not the product of rational choice, nor are they the product of 
informed choice, despite modem contact law's assertions to the 
contrary. 28 I 
Notwithstanding that the modem contract law system's rational 
actor assumption is flawed in theory and practice, it presents yet 
another opportunity for modem contract law to show that it is a self-
legitimating system.282 Forced to acknowledge that people do, in 
fact, enter into contracts that cannot be explained as exercises of 
rationality, modem contract can avoid questioning its assumption of 
rationality by attributing all apparent irrationality to lack of available 
information. More specifically, the modem contract law system 
assumes that people need information to act rationally in making their 
contract decisions.283 At the same time, the system recognizes that 
people do not always have access to the information they need. 
Therefore, any apparent irrationality can be attributed to a lack of 
relevant information. But to the extent that people do not act 
rationally because of a lack of relevant information, the situation can 
be remedied relatively easily via disclosure statutes. Disclosure 
statutes do not actually solve the irrationality problem-in fact they 
probably exacerbate it/84 but this is not really the point. The point is 
that because the information deemed relevant is provided to the 
contracting parties in need of it, modem contract law can then assume 
279. See Rostain, supra note 249, at 978 ("People reason poorly about risk, tend to jump 
too quickly to erroneous conclusions from incomplete information, and are othelWise 
poor statisticians. In short, they consistently fail to determine the most efficient 
means to achieve their preferences."). 
280. See supra text accompanying notes 248-59. That people do not act rationally in the 
market in the way modern contract law assumes they do is very different from saying 
that people do not act in a boundedly rational way. In fact, the whole point of the 
discussion in the text is to show that a boundedly rational actor, which is the type of 
market actor that exists in the real world, is not the same beast as modern contract 
law's rational actor. 
281. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55, 58-59. 
282. See supra text accompanying notes 88-101. I need to thank my friend and colleague 
Professor Katherine C. Sheehan for helping me work out this argument. 
283. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 94, at 650 ("[M]andated disclosure ... rests 
on a plausible assumption: that when it comes to decisionmaking [sic], more 
information is better than less. More information helps people make better decisions, 
thus bolstering their autonomy."). 
284. See infra Part III.B. 
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once again that people will act rationally in the marketplace. Hence, 
the rational actor assumption is reaffirmed and thereby re-
legitimated, which, in tum, leaves the framework for the modem 
contract law system intact. An intact framework means that modem 
contract law remains justified in binding people to their contracts. Or 
so the argument goes. 
6. Parties Do Not Bargain at Arm's Length and They Are Not, 
Most Likely, Strangers to One Another 
One last modem contract law assumption needs to be examined, 
namely that parties to a contract bargain at arm's length and are most 
likely strangers to one another. 285 As with all of the other 
assumptions, this one is also contestable in theory and practice 
because all contracts are relational. 286 
One might argue, however, that the subprime loan transaction 
between CitiMortgage and Mary Smith in the hypothetical is at arm's 
length because the parties probably did not spend a lot of time 
together before or during the closing of the loan,287 they are not going 
to have an ongoing relationship (because the loan was bundled and 
sold as a mortgage backed security), and it was probably a one-time 
deal. However, rather than being "discrete,,,288 the hypothetical 
contract is in fact relational. 
To define and understand a relational contract requires an 
exploration of the late Professor Ian Macneil's relational contract 
285. See supra text accompanying notes 55, 57. 
286. Contracts tend to fall along a relational-discrete continuum-some contracts have 
more relational elements than others at the other end of the spectrum. See Ian R. 
Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 
877, 894-96 (2000) [hereinafter Macneil, Challenges]; Feinman, Relational, supra 
note 48, at 739. See generally William C. Whitford, Ian Macneil's Contribution to 
Contracts Scholarship, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 546 (1985) [hereinafter Whitford, 
Contribution). Notwithstanding this continuum, all contracts are relational because 
even the most "discrete" contract contains relational elements. See infra text 
accompanying notes 291-321. 
287. See, e.g., Willis, supra note 26, at 790 ("Settlement officers typically schedule home 
loan closings every thirty minutes .... "). 
288. See Feinman, Theory, supra note 36, at 1301 ("Some exchanges are relatively 
discrete, involving short duration, limited party interactions, and precise measurement 
of the value of the objects exchanged."); Whitford, Contribution, supra note 286, at 
546 ("[C]ontracts occurring between parties who have little interaction other than the 
contract itself tend to fall on the discrete end ofthe relational-discrete continuum."). 
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theory. 289 To summarize the argument before explaining its 
application here, all contracts are relational because every contract is 
embedded in a particular "social matrix,,290 and in a particular social 
context. To Macneil, contracts are exchange relations,29I and 
exchanges always take place within the complex social relations 
created by the society of which they are a part, that is, within its 
social matrix. With respect to this fundamental social matrix, he 
writes: 
Exchange of any importance is impossible outside a society. 
Even the purest "discrete" exchange postulates a social 
matrix providing at least the following: (1) a means of 
communication understandable to both parties; (2) a system 
of order so that the parties exchange instead of killing and 
stealing; (3) typically, in modem times, a system of money; 
and (4) in the case of exchanges promised, an effective 
mechanism to enforc,e promises.292 
Despite the seemingly discrete attributes of the hypothetical 
contract, therefore, CitiMortgage was only able to make the loan to 
Mary Smith because the social matrix of American society (i.e., a 
common means of communication, a system of money, etc.) made it 
possible. The hypothetical subprime loan is therefore relational in 
this first, basic sense. 
A contract is also relational, however, because of its social 
context. More specifically, all contracts are relational because every 
contract is rooted in a particular social context. To fully understand a 
289. What follows is actually a very limited analysis of relational contract theory. 
Professor Macneil spent decades developing, articulating, refining, and advocating his 
theory. See generally Macneil, Challenges, supra note 286, at 877. For a more in-
depth treatment, see IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO 
MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (\980); Ian Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of 
Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational 
Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854 (1978); Ian Macneil, Relational Contract 
Theory as Sociology: A Reply to Professors Lindenberg and de Vos, 143 J. INST'L & 
THEORETICAL ECON. 272 (1987); Ian Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and 
External, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 340 (1983) [hereinafter, Macneil, Values]. Figuring out 
what constitutes a relational contract, therefore, would only be a beginning. See 
Whitford, Contribution, supra note 286, at 545 (referring to Professor Macneil's 
relational contract theory as a "general theory of the social order"). 
290. Macneil, Values, supra note 289, at 344. 
291. Macneil, Challenges, supra note 286, at 878 ("'[C]ontract' means relations among 
people who have exchanged, are exchanging, or expect to be exchanging in the 
future-in other words, exchange relations."). 
292. Id. at 884. 
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given contract, therefore, it must be situated within the framework of 
the non-discrete relations, what Professor Macneil calls the 
"enveloping relations,,,293 that encompass it. This means, at a 
minimum, that the social context (i.e., its enveloping relations) must 
be understood. 294 But more than that, it means that an effective 
analysis of any transaction will require that all significant relational 
elements be recognized and considered.295 Determining what the 
social context or enveloping relations are in a given transaction is an 
open question,296 but one that will eventually be answered by 
"[c]ommon sense and normal practices of building knowledge on the 
basis of past experience. ,,297 In general, however, the relevant social 
context may be broadly construed. 
Macneil uses the example of relatively small increases and 
decreases in banana prices in supermarkets to illustrate this last 
point.298 He argues first that the "sales of bananas occur in extremely 
complicated supermarket-customer relationships,,,299 and he sets out 
that relationship in some detai1.30o The enveloping relations in this 
initial discussion are confined to the "supermarket-customer 
relationship." But it does not necessarily have to be so limited. He 
says: 
293. /d. at 881, 884. 
294. Id. at 884. 
295. Id. 
296. Macneil acknowledges that "where to stop" in deciding which elements of the 
enveloping relations should be considered is a question. !d. at 885. His response is to 
say that, "[p]robably all that can be said generally about where to stop is that those 
enamored with relational contract theory will probably see important connections, and 
hence the need for their treatment, where those enamored with discrete analytical 
methods will not." Id. at 886 (footnote omitted). 
297. Id. at 884-85. 
298. Id. at 885. 
299. Id. 
300. Thus, Professor Macneil says: 
Id. 
The sale of anyone product is part of an integrated web of 
sophisticated supermarket management of the sale of all of its 
products. In supermarket-consumer relationships, among other 
things, goods are competing with each other for limited and 
varying display space, limited consumer attention, and 
expenditure of limited consumer resources. Elements of these 
relationships are of such a nature that even small changes in the 
price of a fairly simple product may send vibrations through other 
parts of the web, vibrations likely to reverberate back. 
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[B]anana relations are phenomenally complex. Their sale is 
entwined in a particularly tangled international marketing 
and power structure. It involves monopolistic outfits like 
Chiquita International Brand, a variety of conflicting third-
world interests (Latin American countries, Chiquita and 
Chiquita-Iookalike producers vs. small Caribbean island 
countries, particularly non-Chiquita-like producers), and 
European vs. American foreign policy, to say nothing of 
Chiquita as a symbol of American imperialism, 
environmentally damaging practices, big money politics, 
[and] the global capitalistic market generally .... 301 
In short, the relevant social context of a given contract is 
potentially vast and wide-ranging and could include, for example, 
other significant relationships: domestic and international markets, 
domestic and foreign policy, as well as international and domestic 
law. Moreover, the complexity of the seemingly simple "banana 
relations" detailed in the quote are similar to the relations involving 
subprime loans, like the one in the CitiMortgage-Mary Smith 
hypothetical. 
Thus, the social context for the hypothetical subprime loan could 
logically include, among other things, CitiMortgage's relationship 
with its parent company, Citigroup; a variety of institutional entities 
like credit-rating agencies, insurance companies, investment-
management companies (like the now-defunct Merrill Lynch and 
Lehman Brothers); hedge funds; the domestic and international 
financial and capital markets; conflicting investor interests (state 
pension plans, foreign states, and private investors); American and 
international financial policy; and big money politics. 
Assuming the relevant social context for the subprime loan in the 
hypothetical should be more limited, it could still logically include 
the following: a network of laws and regulation/de-regulation of the 
American financial market that permitted subprime loans to be 
marketed and sold302 and allowed the creation and sale of mortgage-
backed securities;303 and Ms. Smith's subprime loan was most likely 
30l. ld. 
302. See supra Part II.A.I. 
303. Professor Oren Bar-Gill provides a very brief and basic description of the 
securitization process that took place in the subprime loan market. He writes: 
During the subprime expansion, origination volume shifted to 
mortgage companies with no independent means to fund the 
originated loans. These mortgage companies, and increasingly 
also depository institutions, sold the loans that they originated to 
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bundled with other CitiMortgage originated subprime loans and 
either sold or mortgaged as a mortgage-backed security to various 
types of investors.304 The context would also have to take into 
account that the security agreements associated with the sale or 
mortgage of the mortgage-backed securities would have included a 
provision prohibiting modification of individual loans within the 
bundle sold or mortgaged to prevent devaluation of the bundle as a 
whole, which, of course, would make individual negotiations with 
distressed debtors extremely difficult, if not impossible,305 and that 
there were conflicting understandings of the lender's obligations, 
with the law saying that lenders (i) owe no fiduciary duty to 
borrowers;306 (ii) have no duty to disclose whether borrowers actually 
Wall Street investment banks that pooled the loans, carved up the 
expected cash flows, and converted these cash flows into bonds 
that were secured by the mortgages. At the peak of the subprime 
expansion, most mortgages were financed through this process of 
securitization. As a result, the "owners" of the loans are the 
investors who purchased shares in these Mortgage (or Asset) 
Backed Securities (MBSs or ABSs). 
Bar-Gill, supra note 16, at 1090-91 (footnotes omitted). 
304. See id. at 1074-75 n.l ("[A]nalyzing data covering approximately 85 percent of 
securitized subprime loans. In 2006, 75 percent of subprime loans were securitized, 
and the authors' data set included 1,772,000 subprime loans originated in 2006, 
implying a total of 1,772,000 I (0.85 * 0.75) = 2,779,608.") (citing Yuliya Demyanyk 
& Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 24 REv. FIN. 
STUD. 1848, 1853 & n.6, 1854 tbl. 1 (2009)). 
305. See Adam J. Levitin, Purchasing Mortgage-Backed Securities Does Not Give the 
Government the Ability to ModifY Mortgages Backing the Securities (2008), 
http://www.law.georgetown.eduifacultyllevitinidocumentsIMBSModificationlssues _ 0 
OO.pdf. 
306. Oaks Mgmt. Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 561,570 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) 
("[I]t is established that absent special circumstances ... a loan transaction is at arms-
length [sic] and there is no fiduciary relationship between the borrower and lender."); 
Nymark v. Heart Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 283 Cal. Rptr. 53, 55, n.l (Cal. Ct. App. 
1991) (rejecting breach of fiduciary duty claim by borrower and holding instead that 
the claim failed as a matter oflaw); Pimetal v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 
2d 32, 39 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding that lenders owe no fiduciary duty to borrowers). 
"The relationship between a lending institution and its borrower-client is not fiduciary 
in nature. A commercial lerider is entitled to pursue its own economic interests in a 
loan transaction. This right is inconsistent with the obligations of a fiduciary which 
require that the fiduciary knowingly agree to subordinate its interests to act on behalf 
of and for the benefit of another." Nymark, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 55 n.l (citations 
omitted); see also Lawrence v. Bank of Am. 209 Cal. Rptr. 541, 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1985) ("[U]nder ordinary circumstances the relationship between a bank and its 
depositor is that of debtor-creditor, and is not a fiduciary one .... "). 
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qualify for the loans they are sold;307 (iii) have no duty to determine 
the borrowers' ability to repay the loan;308 (iv) have no duty to refrain 
from making loans to borrowers whom the lenders know cannot 
repay the loan;309 and (v) have no duty to give borrowers the best 
rates31O-all of which, of course, contradict the understanding held by 
a majority of borrowers. 311 
What the discussion of the social matrix and social context 
applicable to the home mortgage loan between CitiMortgage and 
Mary Smith demonstrates, therefore, is that every contract is 
relational. And because every contract is relational, no contract is 
bargained-for by strangers in an arm's-length transaction. 
A "stranger" is "a person who is unacquainted with or 
unaccustomed to something [ or] a person who is not a member of the 
307. Cross v. Downey Sav. and Loan Ass'n, No. CV_09-317_CAS (SSx), 2009 WL 
481482, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2009) (holding that the financial institution had no 
duty to disclose to the borrower that he could not qualify for the loan); cf Baylor v. 
Jordan, 445 So. 2d 254, 256 (Ala. 1984) ("Courts have traditionally viewed the 
relationship between a bank and its customer as a creditor-debtor relationship which 
does not impose a fiduciary duty of disclosure on the bank."); Nymark, 283 Cal. Rptr. 
at 56 ("[A]s a general rule, a financial institution owes no duty of care to a borrower 
when the institution's involvement in the loan transaction does not exceed the scope of 
its conventional role as a mere lender of money."); In re Vincent v. Ameriquest 
Mortg. Co. (In reo Vincent), 381 B.R. 564, 574 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008) (holding that 
plaintiff failed to allege facts that would impose a fiduciary duty on defendant (lender) 
"to make sure that the loan was suitable based on her circumstances"). 
308. Renteria V. United States, 452 F. Supp. 2d 910, 922 (D. Ariz. 2006) ("[T]he world 
might well be a better place if lenders had a duty to the borrower to determine the 
borrower's ability to repay the loan. No such duty exists. The lender's efforts to 
determine the creditworthiness and ability to repay by a borrower are for the lender's 
protection, not the borrower's."); Norwich Sav. Soc'y V. Caldrello, No. CV89-512204, 
1993 WL 268512, at *9 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 12, 1993) ("A bank does not have a 
duty to investigate a borrower's ability to repay the loan."); Anderson V. Franklin, No. 
2:09-cv-l1096, 2010 U.S. Dist. WL 742765, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 26,2010) ("[T]he 
world might well be a better place if lenders had a duty to the borrower to determine 
the borrower's ability to repay the loan."). 
309. Wagner V. Benson, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the 
lenders did not owe a duty of care to the borrowers in approving the loan); N. Trust 
CO. V. VIII S. Mich. Assocs., 657 N.E.2d 1095, 1102 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) ("The lender 
also has no duty to refrain from making a loan if the lender knows or should know 
that the borrower cannot repay the loan."). 
310. See, e.g., Brazier V. Sec. Pac. Mortg., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1143 (W.D. Wash. 
2003) (holding that no law requires a mortgage broker to negotiate for a borrower to 
obtain the best rate from the lender). 
311. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 27, at 32 ("The 2002 Fannie Mae National 
Housing Survey found that over half of all African-American and Hispanic borrowers 
erroneously believed that lenders are required by law to provide the best possible loan 
rates."). 
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family, group, community, or the like"; while "arm's length" means 
"not closely or intimately connected or associated.,,312 Under 
Macneil's relational contract theory, the home mortgage contract 
between CitiMortgage and Mary Smith is not between strangers or at 
arm's length, because a social matrix and a particular social context 
tie these parties together. They share, for example, a common 
understanding of money, language, and system of order. 313 In 
addition, a myriad of customs (e.g., one should be on time for 
appointments and pay one's bills), understandings (spoken or 
unspoken and legal or not),314 as well as laws and regulations315 add 
integral parts to the relations between the parties. The transaction 
between CitiMortgage and Mary Smith, therefore, is "deeply 
embedded in a wide range of interconnected relations.,,316 
Consequently, and contrary to modem contract law's assumption,317 
there simply are no strangers in a given society and an arm's-length 
transaction is an oxymoron. 
B. The Universe of Contracts 
It should be clear from the discussion in the last part of this article 
that all of modem contract law's assumptions are deeply flawed, if 
not fallacious. The implications for the efficacy of disclosure statutes 
should be apparent, but will be discussed in more detail later. 318 The 
broader point to be made, however, is that, because the assumptions 
are highly questionable, modem contract law cannot justify holding 
parties to their contracts. Yet the contract between CitiMortgage and 
Mary Smith is binding-it satisfies contract law's formation 
requirements, and given the presumption of contract validity, all of its 
terms (reasonable and unreasonable) are likely enforceable between 
the parties.319 Consequently, absent the justification that the 
assumptions seemingly provide, continuing to bind Mary Smith and 
CitiMortgage to this contract is an unmitigated exercise of state 
power.320 
312. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 115, 1880 (2d ed. 
1987). 
313. See supra text accompanying notes 289-92 (laying out Macneil's social matrix). 
314. See supra text accompanying notes 289-97. 
315. See supra Part lI.A.l. 
316. Macneil, Values, supra note 289, at 345. 
317. See supra text accompanying note 57. 
318. See infra Part III.B. 
319. See supra text accompanying notes 64-83. 
320. See supra note 138. 
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But the existence and use of this unmitigated state power within 
the modern contract law system is not confined to the type of contract 
exemplified by the CitiMortgage-Mary Smith contract. In other 
words, it is not confined to a bad bargain procured through the 
improper use of unequal bargaining power. Rather, this 
unadulterated use of state power extends to all contracts formed 
within the modern contract law system. 321 
In response to the claim that all contracts are made binding as an 
exercise of state power, one could argue that the critique of modern 
contract law articulated in this article covers too much. This is 
because some contracts "work"-both sides get what they want from 
the deal and walk away once the contract has been completely 
executed. Contracts that "work" in this manner ostensibly pose no 
problem, and, therefore, to the extent that the analysis includes these 
contracts in the critique, the critique is overbroad. It is not, for the 
reasons elaborated below. 
Contracts can be formed in circumstances of unequal bargaining 
power or not, where bargaining power is defined322 to include 
anything-resources (money, time, staff), experience, expertise, 
knowledge, etc.-that gives one party a bargaining advantage over 
the other party.323 The terms of contracts can also be "fair" or not. 
Fairness in terms, however, is much harder to conceptualize, for the 




Dictionary, for example, defines "fair" as 
equitable; disinterested[;]... [f]ree of bias or 
321. I need to thank my friend, Professor Nancy Kim, for bringing this issue to my 
attention. 
322. BARN HIZER, Bargaining Power, supra note 94, at 92 ("A party has bargaining power 
if she has the ability to effect intelligently a preferred outcome in a bargaining 
relationship. "). 
323. Some scholars appear to distinguish party sophistication from bargaining power. See 
generally Miller, supra note 54, at 495-96. The distinction turns on the definition of a 
"sophisticated party." See generally id. at 494-95 ("For its ubiquity, party 
sophistication remains an unstudied and largely unaddressed question in contract law. 
Although they often mention sophistication, the extensive contract treatises of 
Williston, Corbin and Farnsworth do not dedicate a section to clarifying what is meant 
by the terminology. This article begins the discussion."). I think it is entirely possible 
that the sophistication of the contracting parties is at least an element of bargaining 
power, if not just bargaining power under another name. In other words, the more 
sophisticated a party is, especially vis-a-vis its contracting partner, the more likely it is 
that the sophisticated party will be able to procure a contract that favors its interests. 
If this admittedly oversimplified analysis is correct, then it seems to me that "party 
sophistication" becomes just another way to say that one party has superior bargaining 
power. 
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prejudice. ,,324 To some economists, fairness suggests that "some 
legal opportunities for gain are not exploited.,,325 To non-economists, 
fairness is a way to incorporate other-regarding preferences.326 To 
political philosophers like John Rawls, fair terms are ones that a 
citizen might reasonably offer and which the citizens to whom such 
terms are offered might also reasonably accept. 327 Implicit in Rawls's 
use of "reasonably" twice in his conception of fair terms is the 
understanding that the citizens he refers to are "free and equal, and 
not ... dominated or manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior 
political or social position.,,328 
Hence, fair terms seem to presuppose either the absence of 
superior bargaining power or the existence of superior bargaining 
power that is not used to exploit gain. To achieve such a result would 
thus seem to require implementation of a version of Rawls's veil of 
ignorance.329 That is, the terms of the contract would have to be 
determined in a situation where the parties did not know their own 
bargaining power and, therefore, which side of the bargaining table 
they would end up on (the strong or weak side). 
In theory, the idea of bargaining through a veil of ignorance to 
achieve objectively fair contract terms is very appealing and should 
be explored further. 330 But it is unclear how workable a solution this 
will be because unequal bargaining power is a fact of life and 
expecting market actors to go against their economic self-interest to 
the extent necessary to produce such terms seems unrealistic. That 
said, some contracts are objectively better than others. A "bad 
bargain," for example, is one in which the terms unreasonably favor 
one party.331 With this understanding of a bad bargain as a baseline, a 
contract on fair terms would be a contract in which there is a mix of 
terms favorable to each party such that the terms do not unreasonably 
favor one of the contracting parties. The pivotal point is the point 
where the terms become unreasonably favorable to one of the parties, 
and, at that tipping point, that particular contract would be deemed 
324. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
325. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Fairness and the 
Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. Bus. S285, S286 (1986). 
326. Michael B. Dorff & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, The Perils of Forgetting Fairness, 59 
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 597, 606 (2009). 
327. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, at xliv (1996). 
328. ld. 
329. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-23 (rev. ed. 1999). 
330. See Singer, Standards, supra note 142, at 159. 
331. Hart, supra note 5, at 179 n.14. 
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unfair. In other words, a bad bargain would represent a contract on 
"unfair" terms.332 
Notwithstanding that contracts can vary with respect to these two 
factors-with some having fair terms, and some resulting from no 
inequality of bargaining power-all of them are still subject to the 
critique made in this article, because all of them have something else 
in common. Specifically, regardless of whether the terms are fair or 
whether any inequality of bargaining power exists in formation, a 
contract is likely to be found to be valid and enforceable under 
modem contract law. This is because the presumption of contract 
validity springs into existence upon formation (via mutual assent and 
consideration),333 and, for reasons discussed earlier, it is extremely 
difficult to overcome this presumption.334 The presumption of 
contract validity plus enforcement means that all contracts are likely 
to be binding under modem contract law, including but not limited to 
ones that are both unfair and the product of abuse of bargaining 
power,m arguably like the home mortgage loan between 
CitiMortgage and Mary Smith. 
Modem contract law does not justify contracts that have fair terms 
or were created with no inequality of bargaining power by pointing to 
their fairness or the lack of inequality. Rather, as discussed earlier, 
modem contract law makes contracts binding because of the 
assumptions the system makes about the parties, the market, and the 
role of the state.336 All of these assumptions are ostensibly at work 
regardless of whether a contract was formed under circumstances of 
unequal bargaining power or has resulted in unfair terms. A brief 
hypothetical will illustrate this central point. 
Assume that a man on a road trip to a place he has never been 
before walks into a convenience store, selects a candy bar from the 
shelf, and then takes it to the store clerk (whom he has never met), 
who rings up the sale. After paying the clerk, the man leaves the 
store and eats his candy bar. Despite the fact that no words were 
spoken, a contract for the sale of the candy bar was formed. 337 
332. For purposes of this argument, it need only be assumed that a line can be drawn 
between fair and unfair; it is not necessary to decide where that line would be. 
333. See supra text accompanying notes 69-83. 
334. See supra text accompanying notes 69-83. 
335. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85. 
336. See supra text accompanying notes 53-63. 
337. See U.c.c. § 2-204(1) (2003) ("A contract for the sale of goods may be made in any 
manner sufficient to show agreement, including ... conduct by both parties which 
recognizes the existence of [such] a contract .... "); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981) ("A promise may be stated in words either oral or written, 
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All of modem contract law's assumptions are ostensibly at work 
in making this simple contract binding.338 Specifically, one could 
argue that the sale represents a private, arm's-length transaction 
between private parties who were literally strangers to one another. 
The man's choice of the candy bar was voluntary, presumably 
infonned, and the product of rational choice. The self-regulating 
market worked just fine and without state interference, having only 
set the price of the candy bar. And the state's role with respect to the 
entire transaction was neutral and minimal. But just as with the 
subprime mortgage loan contract between CitiMortgage and Mary 
Smith, all of the assumptions are dubious in the context of this simple 
contract as well and for the same reasons. 
To begin with, the market for the sale of a candy bar would be 
unrecognizable without the web of laws implicated in constructing 
the market for the sale of food, like a candy bar. This would include, 
but certainly not be limited to, laws governing food labeling,339 
manufacturing and safety regulations/40 as well as extensive 
involvement by agencies such as the United States Department of 
Agriculture34I and the Federal Food and Drug Administration. 342 
Consequently, the market for the sale of a candy bar is inseparable 
from the laws that create the market. The candy bar market is, 
therefore, not self-regulating or largely outside of state control. 
Nor is the contract for the candy bar voluntary, as it was procured 
through mutual coercion,343 specifically, with the clerk implicitly 
saying, "payor I withhold the candy bar," and the man implicitly 
responding, "give me the candy bar or I withhold my money." The 
or may be inferred wholly or partly from conduct."); id. § 19(1) ("The manifestation 
of assent may be made wholly or partly by written or spoken words or by other acts or 
by failure to act. "). 
338. See generally supra text accompanying notes 55-63 (listing the assumptions). 
339. See, e.g., Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, lOA 
Stat. 2353. 
340. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 348 (2006) (governing food additives); 42 U.S.C. § 242r (2006) 
(governing improvement and publication of data on food-related allergic responses); 
21 U.S.C. § 343 (2006) (governing misbranded food); 21 U.S.C. § 374 (2006) 
(governing inspection of locations where food is manufactured, processed, packaged 
or held). 
341. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., http://www.usda.gov/wps/portaVusda/ (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2011). 
342. See generally, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov (last visited Nov. 26, 
2011 ). 
343. See supra text accompanying notes 206-13. 
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contract for the candy bar was thus formed to avoid these mutual 
threats. 
Moreover, the state says that contracts formed by conduct are 
valid.344 The state also says that a sale of goods, like the sale of a 
candy bar, is enforceable345 and would be enforced by the state 
through, for example, its shoplifting laws.346 Hence, because the state 
decides whether the contract for the candy bar is enforceable and will 
actually enforce this contract/47 the contract for the sale of the candy 
bar is public, not private. 
The state was actively involved in creating the market for the sale 
of the candy bar and ultimately decides whether the contract for the 
candy bar is enforceable. For these and other reasons as well,348 it 
would be very difficult to say that the state's role in this contract is 
neutral or minimal. The state, therefore, is as much a party to the 
contract for the sale of the candy bar as the parties to that contract 
themselves. Consequently, it is also impossible to say that contracts 
are just between private parties. 
And while the man choosing a candy bar off of a convenience 
store shelf may not have been acting irrationally, there is also nothing 
to suggest that he was acting as a rational actor in making his 
selection. To satisfy modem contract law's version of the rational 
actor, the man choosing the candy bar would have to be able to rank 
all of the possible candy bar choices, based on all the information 
provided him (from the label of the available candy bars, for 
example), in the order in which they maximize his expected utility, 
which generally means maximizing his wealth.349 While it is possible 
that some people may act in this fashion, it seems fairly safe to say 
that this behavior does not describe how most people purchase candy 
bars.35o The contract for the candy bar, therefore, is not the product 
of informed or rational choice, at least not in the way that modem 
contract law constructs the rational actor. 
344. See supra note 337 (cites for contracts formed by conduct). 
345. See generally V.e.e. §§ 2-101 to -804 (2011). 
346. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 490.1 (West 2010) (dealing with petty theft where the 
value taken is less than fifty dollars and stating that the punishment for petty theft is 
by fine not exceeding two hundred and fifty dollars). 
347. See supra Part II.A.3. 
348. See supra Part ILA.4. 
349. See supra text accompanying notes 249-53 (discussing modem contract law's rational 
actor). 
350. Cj Ben-Shahar, Myth, supra note 131, at 2 ("Apart from an exotic individual here or 
there, nobody reads."). 
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Finally, the parties did not bargain at arm's length, nor were they 
strangers to one another, because of the social matrix351 (i.e., the 
parties shared a common language, system of money, etc., that 
enabled the sale of the candy bar to take place) and the social 
contexf52 within which the sale took place.353 This context would 
include, for example, customs (one should pay for something before 
eating it); relational characteristics, like brand loyalty to a particular 
kind of candy bar; laws, including, but not limited to, local zoning 
laws that made having a convenience store possible in a particular 
location, laws pertaining to interstate travel, and Article 2 (sale of 
goods) of the Uniform Commercial Code; and regulations (i.e., 
requiring store clerks to wash their hands after using the restroom). 
The social matrix and social context applicable to the sale of the 
candy bar, therefore, show that this contract is also relational, and not 
an arm's-length transaction between strangers. 
Thus, since all of the assumptions are deeply flawed and highly 
contestable, both theoretically and in practice,354 the argument is that 
modem contract law cannot justify making any contracts binding. 
Nonetheless, modem contract law in practical application does just 
that. Consequently, the inescapable conclusion is that modem 
contract law makes all contracts binding as an unmitigated exercise 
of state power. 
III. CONTRACT LAW AND UNEQUAL BARGAINING POWER 
The critique so far is not that all contracts produced under the 
framework of modem contract law present a problem calling for a 
remedy or some other kind of state sponsored interference. In fact, 
most contracts produced by the modem contract law system would 
not currently require such intervention. Rather, the critique is simply 
that all contracts are made binding as an exercise of state power. 
Making contracts binding in this fashion, however, ensures that 
unequal bargaining power is and will continue to be a systemic and 
structural feature of the modem contract law system. 
351. See supra text accompanying notes 291-92. 
352. See supra text accompanying notes 293-97 (explaining "social context"). 
353. See supra text accompanying notes 291-92. The social context for the sale of the 
candy bar would be fairly analogous to that described in Professor Macneil's example 
of the sale of bananas in a supermarket. See supra notes 298-301 and accompanying 
text. 
354. See supra Part II.A (discussing why the six assumptions of modem contract law are 
flawed). 
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A. Synergy: State Power and Unequal Bargaining Power 
The types of power at work in the modem contract law system can 
be distinguished. There is state power, which makes all contracts 
binding,355 and there is an individual contracting party's bargaining 
power. Continuing to distinguish them in this way is conceptually 
useful. But the distinction is also a fiction because individual 
bargaining power is power that is ultimately conferred by the state 
through property rights. 356 Recall that the state determines property 
rights.357 Property rights, in tum, translate into individual bargaining 
power-the more one party owns, the more bargaining power that 
party commands and, therefore, the more that party will be able to 
dictate contract terms.358 Thus, state power is always implicated and 
in many ways instantiated in every contract because it is present in 
the modem contract law system in both of these ways. A synergistic 
relationship is thereby created, the effect of which is to increase and 
reify the bargaining power of the party with more bargaining power. 
The synergism works this way: Individual bargaining power 
enables the party with more bargaining power (the "stronger party") 
to dictate contract terms. Bargaining power is increased via each 
contract the stronger party enters into, because the stronger party is 
able to reap more gains from each contract than it otherwise would 
with less bargaining power. The stronger party's bargaining power is 
then reified each time a contract is formed, because contracts formed 
via mutual assent and consideration are generally going to be 
binding.359 The premise that contracts are made binding, therefore, 
ensures that the stronger party will be able to retain the benefits from 
each of its contracts. Consequently, and over time, the stronger party 
will end up owning more resources (money, property, labor, capital, 
etc.). And then the synergism comes full circle because the more one 
party owns, the more bargaining power that party has, and so on.360 
B. Institutionalizing Unequal Bargaining Power 
Regardless of its source, unequal bargaining power exists.361 
Unequal bargaining power poses difficulties for modem contract law 
355. See supra Part II.A. 
356. See supra text accompanying notes 146-52,210-12. 
357. See supra text accompanying notes 220-21. 
358. See supra text accompanying notes 146-49, 21l. 
359. See supra text accompanying notes 83-87. 
360. See Mensch, Ideology, supra note 207, at 762. 
361. See Barnhizer, Inequality, supra note 15, at 240. 
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when it is used, for example, to obtain a bad bargain.362 This problem 
is very real because modem contract law does not effectively address 
unequal bargaining power. First, with the exception of disclosure 
statutes, all of modem contract law's remedial mechanisms, like 
contract interpretation and defenses to enforcement, are available 
only after a contract is formed. 363 Indeed, this structural aspect of 
modem contract law is partly what gives rise to the presumption of 
contract validity.364 Recall that the presumption essentially makes all 
contracts formed via mutual assent and consideration binding, 
including contracts procured through an improper use of unequal 
bargaining power?65 Second, the tools modem contract law relies 
upon to address unequal bargaining power are ineffective. 366 
Because unequal bargaining power is not effectively addressed, its 
use and abuse within the modem contract law system remains hidden 
and, more importantly, unchecked. In this way, modem contract law 
institutionalizes unequal bargaining power, which ultimately 
redounds to the benefit of the party with more bargaining power. 
Disclosure statutes provide an excellent illustration of this argument. 
In theory, disclosure statutes are supposed to provide notice to the 
weaker contracting party367 about important terms of which she 
would probably not otherwise be aware. The weaker contracting 
party will therefore have actual knowledge, at least with respect to 
the disclosed terms, before expressing her assent to the contract. 
Since mutual assent is still a required element of contract 
formation/68 disclosure statutes are supposed to improve the quality 
of the weaker party's mutual assent, by ensuring that the weaker 
party's assent was informed. 369 
Unfortunately, disclosure statutes are premised on the same 
assumptions that make up the framework for modem contract law.370 
As previously discussed in detail, all of these assumptions are 
362. See Hart, supra note 5, at 210-15. 
363. See supra notes 75-77 (contract interpretation and defenses to enforcement). 
364. See supra text accompanying notes 69-85. 
365. See supra text accompanying notes 83, 86-87. 
366. See Hart, supra note 5, at 198-218 (discussing in detail why modem contract law's 
expanded policing doctrines, namely, unconscionability, economic duress, and 
misrepresentation do not effectively address the unequal bargaining power, and, 
therefore bad bargain problems). 
367. "Weaker" is used here to refer to the party that does not have access on his own to the 
information in the possession of the stronger party. 
368. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 17(1), 22(1)(1981}. 
369. See Ben·Shahar & Schneider, supra note 94, at 649-51. 
370. See supra text accompanying notes 56-63. 
68 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 41 
fallacious. 371 As a direct result, disclosure statutes will not work. 372 
In fact, empirical studies support this conclusion.373 They will not 
remedy unequal bargaining power in the form of information 
asymmetries.374 Compliance with disclosure statutes, therefore, will 
not actually increase the quality of the weaker party's mutual assent. 
Instead, compliance with disclosure statutes will produce two adverse 
outcomes, both of which serve to strengthen the presumption of 
contract validity. 375 
The obvious outcome is that compliance with disclosure statutes 
will give the appearance that the quality of the weaker party's mutual 
assent has increased, when in fact it has not. That is, such 
compliance merely improves the image but not the substance of the 
resulting contract-it is ostensibly no longer a product of power and 
pressure of the stronger party but an act of a better balanced and well-
considered decision-making process.376 
371. See supra Part II.A. 
372. See generally Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 94, at 665-729 (documenting the 
failure of mandated disclosure and laying out in detail why mandated disclosure does 
not work). 
373. For example, Professor Florencia Marotta-Wurgler recently conducted empirical 
research to examine the "informed minority" justification for disclosure statutes. 
Marotta-Wurgler, Disclosure, supra note 112, at 3--4. Her study made two main 
findings: (1) increasing contract accessibility did not result in an economically 
significant increase in contract readership, id. at 4, 18-26, 30, and (2) the very few 
shoppers who actually did read the online end user license agreements (EULAs) were 
equally likely to purchase a product regardless of whether the EULA was buyer-
friendly. Id. at 4,27-30. As a result, Marotta-Wurgler concluded that the informed 
minority justification for disclosure statutes "is simply too weak to make any 
difference in this setting," and that "[d]isclosure per se [would] result in little increase 
in readership or economic pressure on sellers." Id. at 31. Significantly, Marotta-
Wurgler also notes that, since "search and access costs are so low online ... increased 
contract disclosure would seem even more likely to be ineffective in increasing 
shopper attention [in] omine contexts as well." Id.; see also Whitford, Disclosure, 
supra note 102, at 430-31 (focusing on Truth-in-Lending in an early attempt to assess 
whether disclosure statutes are effective in accomplishing their purposes, and 
tentatively concluding, both empirically and theoretically, that disclosure statutes 
would have little impact); Marotta-Wurgler, Disclosure, supra note 112, at 8-9 (citing 
prior empirical evidence on the effectiveness of disclosure regimes). 
374. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 94, at 742--43. 
375. See supra text accompanying notes 69-83 (discussing the presumption of contract 
validity). 
376. Cf Ben-Shahar, Myth, supra note 131, at 3 ("[In the context of the 'opportunity to 
read,'] it is now a standard view to confront the unreadness[ -of-contracts] reality with 
myths, fictions, and presumptions, all intended to preserve a conceptual apparatus that 
fits a world in which transactors know all the terms"). 
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The more perverse outcome,377 however, is that such compliance 
will likely eliminate several contract policing doctrines that would 
otherwise be available to challenge the presumption of contract 
validity.378 For example, a claim that the implied obligation of good 
faith was breached would probably fail because the term was 
disclosed up front. 379 Assuming compliance with applicable 
disclosure statute(s), a claim or defense based on fraud or 
misrepresentation, including misrepresentation in the form of a 
material non-disclosure,38o would also likely fail because there would 
arguably be no fraudulent or material misrepresentation.381 
377. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 94, at 738 ("[M]andated disclosure can 
undennine other consumer protections ... [like] unconscionability .... "); cf 
Marotta-Wurgler, Disclosure, supra note 112, at 12 ("[C]ourts might mistakenly be 
led to believe that sellers' tenns are the product of well-functioning market 
mechanisms and be more lenient in policing abusive tenns."). 
378. There are other contract policing doctrines whose efficacy would be unaffected by any 
type of disclosure, like duress and undue influence. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS §§ 175 (duress), 177 (undue influence) (1981). Unfortunately, these 
doctrines will generally be of little help to the individual because they are often 
unsuccessful when raised. My theory about why these traditional doctrines, like the 
other policing doctrines mentioned, are unsuccessful turns on the fact that (1) all of 
these doctrines are available only after the contract is fonned in the first instance; see 
supra text accompanying notes 81-82; and, consequently, (2) they are all subject to a 
"process problem" that makes successfully raising any of these doctrines in litigation 
unlikely. See Rart, supra note 5, at 210-16 (discussing the "process problem" in 
detail); supra text accompanying notes 73-90; Grace M. Giesel, A Realistic Proposal 
for the Contract Doctrine of Duress, 107 W. VA. L. REv. 443, 463-65 (2005) 
(concluding, on the basis of an empirical study of duress cases, that because of the 
"conflict and confusion" surrounding the elements of duress, only a small fraction of 
duress claims are successful); Morant, MLK, supra note 40, at 110 ("The existence of 
regulatory devices [like] duress, unconscionability, and undue influence cannot ... 
sufficiently accommodate marketplace inequities. The... dearth of cases where 
individuals are successful in obtaining relief through those devices substantiates this 
point. This result is compounded by the heavy burden of proof placed upon the 
claimant of such relief.") (footnotes omitted). Cf Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis 
Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 
33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1067, 1097 (2006) ("Data revealed that in only 37.8% (56 out 
of 148) ofthe cases sampled unconscionability was found .... "). 
379. See supra note 107 (discussing Robert Summers's interpretation of the good faith 
requirement as requiring disclosure). See generally Rouh, supra note 107, at 1027-28 
(containing a much more expansive interpretation of good faith). 
380. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1981) (when non-disclosure 
is equivalent to an assertion). 
381. A contract claim for misrepresentation requires a fraudulent or material 
misrepresentation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1981). By 
definition, a misrepresentation, whether fraudulent or material, presupposes that a 
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In all likelihood, an unconscionability82 claim or defense would 
probably fail, again because of the disclosure of the term. Under 
these circumstances, there is no "unfair surprise" and, therefore, 
arguably, no procedural unconscionability. 383 Indeed, the argument 
stated more particularly would be that there was compliance with the 
disclosure statute and, as a result, there simply can be no procedural 
unconscionability.384 The party raising unconscionability either as a 
claim or defense usually must prove both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability to prevail. 385 
In short, compliance with disclosure statutes only serves to 
strengthen the presumption of contract validity by making it appear 
that the quality of the weaker party's mutual assent has increased and 
by ruling out the application of several contract policing doctrines. 
By strengthening the presumption of contract validity, these 
outcomes (1) simultaneously create systemic incentives for the party 
with more bargaining power to impose even more onerous or one-
sided terms during contract formation; 386 and (2) increase the power 
"false" statement is being made. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
Actual compliance with a disclosure statute would preclude a false statement in the 
disclosures made. Recall also that there is no duty on the part of a lender, for 
example, to disclose whether borrowers actually qualify for the loans they are sold. 
See supra text accompanying notes 306-11. 
382. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (unconscionable contract or 
term); U.C.C. § 2-302 (2011) (unconscionable contract or clause). 
383. Cf Robert A. Hillman, On-Line Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of 
E-Standard Terms Baclifire?, 104 MICH. L. REv. 837, 840, 853 (2006) (making the 
same argument regarding unconscionability in the context of on-line contracting). 
384. According to U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URB. DEV. & U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO CURB PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 67 (2000), 
available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdfi'treasrpt.pdf, "The fact is that 
written disclosure requirements, without other protections, can have the unintended 
effect of insulating predatory lenders where fraud or deception may have occurred." 
385. See, e.g., A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 121-22 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1982); Leff, supra note 108, at 487-88. But see Gillman v. Chase Manhattan 
Bank, 534 N.E.2d 824,829 (N.Y. 1998) ("While determinations of unconscionability 
are ordinarily based on the court's conclusion that both the procedural and substantive 
components are present, there have been exceptional cases where a provision of the 
contract is so outrageous as to warrant holding it unenforceable on the ground of 
substantive unconscionability alone.") (citations omitted); State v. Wolowitz, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 131, 145 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) ("While there may be extreme cases where 
a contractual term is so outrageous and oppressive as to warrant a finding of 
unconscionability irrespective of the contract formation process (see, e.g., Jones v. 
Star Credit Corp., 298 N'y.S.2d 264 266-67 (Sup. Ct. 1969», such cases are the 
exception. "). 
386. This is because any subsequent challenge to the validity of the terms added during 
formation will likely fail. 
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of that stronger contracting party by effectively immunizing the 
exercise of that bargaining power during contract formation from 
subsequent challenge (i.e., by eliminating several contract policing 
doctrines).387 In the hypothetical subprime loan transaction between 
CitiMortgage and Mary Smith,388 for example, it could be argued that 
CitiMortgage was incentivized to impose the onerous terms (high 
origination and post-origination fees, the prepayment penalty clause, 
and high interest rate )389 on Mary Smith because it could do so with 
little risk of liability. 390 
One could argue in response to the hypothetical in general that 
using a subprime mortgage loan is the wrong example. 391 The real 
problem is not the subprime loan, but rather that the American 
financial market crashed.392 Both parties-CitiMortgage and Mary 
Smith-ended up doing very badly as a result of it. While this 
387. See supra text accompanying notes 366-72. See generally Hart, supra note 5. 
388. See supra text accompanying notes 16-30. 
389. See supra text accompanying notes 26-30. 
390. There is low risk of liability to CitiMortgage because of compliance with the 
disclosure statutes and the presumption of contract validity. 
39l. One could also argue that using a subprime mortgage loan is the wrong example 
because it involves a very complex transaction where the inequality of bargaining 
power between the parties is stark. As a result, the subprime loan example presents 
the "too easy" case, that is, the type of case that would obviously expose flaws in the 
modem contract law system. While I agree that a subprime loan contract is extremely 
complex, I disagree that it is the wrong example. 
The subprime mortgage loan was chosen precisely because it is a problematic 
transaction on its face-the unequal bargaining power and unfair terms seem 
apparent. This is exactly the type of contract that one would think contract law would 
be well equipped to deal with, precisely because it is so obviously problematic. One 
of the main points this article tries to drive home, however, is that the modem contract 
law system is not set up to deal effectively with this kind of contract even though it is 
one that most people would likely agree is troubling. If contract law cannot even deal 
effectively with this kind of contract, then the likelihood that it will be able to deal 
well with contracts that are not as obviously problematic, but which nevertheless 
present issues with which contract law should be concerned, is greatly diminished. 
The subprime loan was also chosen because it involves disclosure statutes. Another 
main argument made in this article is that disclosure statutes do not work, but they 
give the appearance that something is being done to address a specific problem in 
contracting. Because something is being done, no further inquiry is made. As a 
result, other very real problems get glossed over, specifically, racial and gender bias. 
The subprime loan example allows me to make this important point. See infra Part 
IlI.e. 
392. In fact, this is exactly the argument Professor Victor Goldberg made in response to 
my presentation based on this article at the Spring Contracts Conference held at the 
William S. Boyd School of Law, at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, in February. 
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general statement is correct, it misses the main thrust of this article's 
analysis and critique of modem contract law. To see the flaw, one 
need only consider the implications of the transaction for both parties 
with and without the financial market crash. 
Prior to the financial market crash, CitiMortgage sold Mary Smith 
a loan that she did not qualify for and on terms that dramatically 
increased its profits on the 10an.393 Absent the financial market crash, 
CitiMortgage would have made a lot of money on its contract with 
Mary Smith to Mary Smith's detriment. CitiMortgage, therefore, ran 
into trouble only because the financial market crashed, not because of 
the subprime loan it sold to Mary Smith.394 
Mary Smith, on the other hand, would have still been at the wrong 
end of a very bad bargain, regardless of whether the financial market 
crashed or not. She was sold a loan she did not qualify for and on 
very bad terms, ones that she could not afford.395 The crux of Mary 
Smith's problem, therefore, stems from the subprime loan contract 
itsel[.196 This is because the presumption of contract validity springs 
into existence immediately upon contract formation, and the burden 
of rebutting the presumption is imposed on the weaker contracting 
party,397 here, Mary Smith. Given that it is extremely difficult to 
393. See supra text accompanying notes 16-30 (laying out the hypothetical). 
394. Fonner Citigroup chief executive officer Charles Prince and fonner chainnan of the 
board Robert Rubin admitted as much in recent testimony before the Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission. Mr. Prince stated, "I'm sorry that our management team, 
starting with me, like so many others, could not see the unprecedented market 
collapse that lay before us." Mr. Rubin testified in a similar vein when he stated that, 
"[a]lmost all of us in the financial system - including financial finns, regulators, 
rating agencies, analysts and commentators - missed the powerful combination of 
forces at work and the serious possibility of a massive crisis" and, "We all bear 
responsibility for not recognizing this, and I deeply regret that." Jim Puzzanghera, 
Two Former Top Citigroup Executives Apologize for Crisis and Bailout, L.A. TIMES 
(Apr. 9, 2010), http://articles.latimes.comlprintl20 10/apr/09Ibusinesslla-fi-citi-
bailout9-20 1 Oapr09. 
395. See supra text accompanying notes 26-30 (terms of the loan). 
396. In fact, regardless of whether the market rose, stayed the same, or crashed, Mary 
Smith was sold a mortgage loan on very bad tenns. So even if the market rose and 
Ms. Smith was able to refinance her house, she would still be worse off as a result of 
her loan with CitiMortgage than she would have been had she not been sold a loan on 
such bad terms. The focus on the housing market crash, therefore, is simply 
misplaced. The real problem is the unfairness of the subprime loan contract between 
CitiMortgage and Mary Smith. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (suggesting 
that the high prepayment penalty in Mary Smith's subprime loan could have made it 
prohibitively expensive to refinance out of her loan with CitiMortgage at all, let alone 
prior to CitiMortgage's upward adjustment of its adjustable rate mortgages). 
397. See Hart, supra note 5, at 204---16; supra text accompanying notes 73-74. 
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overcome the presumption of contract validity in practice,398 any 
terms (reasonable or unreasonable) imposed by the party with more 
bargaining power (CitiMortgage) during contract formation would 
likely be deemed valid and enforceable in any subsequent dispute 
between the two contracting parties.399 The contract, in other words, 
would be binding and Mary Smith would be stuck with her very bad 
bargain with CitiMortgage, regardless of the financial market crash 
and whether CitiMortgage kept the loan itself or sold it to another 
entity. 
Ironically, instead of protecting the rights of someone like Mary 
Smith, the weaker contracting party, compliance with disclosure 
statutes will actually undermine them400 in favor of CitiMortgage, the 
party with more bargaining power. Significantly, CitiMortgage's 
abuse of its superior bargaininffi power will probably remain hidden 
because the process problem4 1 will either prevent a challenge to 
these subprime mortgages from going to court in the first instance 402 
or will cause most of the challenges that do make it through the 
courthouse doors to fail. 403 This is at least in part because the already 
enormous costs of litigation would be compounded by choice of 
forum clauses that would likely require litigation in a foreign state; 404 
choice of law clauses usually adopt the law of a non-consumer 
friendly state to resolve the dispute;405 and, of course, modern 
contract law's solutions, namely, the contract policing and defense to 
398. See supra text accompanying notes 72-82. See generally Hart, supra note 5, at 210-
16. 
399. In fact, it has already been established that subprime loans are enforceable. See supra 
text accompanying notes 238-40. 
400. Hillman, supra note 383, at 853-55. 
40 I. See supra text accompanying notes 72-82. 
402. Mandatory arbitration provisions would also prevent challenges to subprime 
mortgages from getting into court. Many, if not most, of the subprime loan contracts 
include such provisions. See, e.g., Civil Rights Groups Commend Freddie Mac's 
Leadership in Banning Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE 
LENDING (Dec. 9, 2003), http;llwww.responsiblelending.orgimedia-center/press-
releases/archives/groups-commend-freddie-mac-ban-on-mandatory-arbitration.html 
("In recent years, the inclusion of mandatory arbitration language in subprime 
mortgage contracts has become increasingly common ... , The increasing inclusion of 
mandatory arbitration clauses in subprime home loans without the borrower's 
knowledge has been especially pernicious, disproportionately affecting seniors, low-
income, African-American and other minority families."); Salley v. Option One 
Mortg. Corp., 246 F. App'x 87, 90 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that the arbitration clause 
in a subprime mortgage contract was not unconscionable). 
403. c.f. Hart, supra note 5, at 214-15. 
404. Hart, supra note 5, at 215 n.218. 
405. Id. n.219. 
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performance doctrines, would be ineffective or unavailable in most 
cases to resolve the problem.406 As a result, CitiMortgage's abuse of 
its unequal bargaining power would also go unaddressed. Unequal 
bargaining power is thereby institutionalized in the modem contract 
law system, and, as a consequence, the system effectively permits the 
party with more bargaining power (CitiMortgage), if it so chooses, to 
impose bad bargains on its contracting partners (e.g., Mary Smith) 
with impunity. 
406. The contract policing doctrines would be ineffective in most cases to resolve the 
unequal bargaining problem because (a) disclosure pursuant to the disclosure statutes 
could rule out the application of several contract policing doctrines entirely, see supra 
text accompanying notes 365-72 (discussing the policing doctrines potentially 
affected); (b) the contract policing doctrines are not generally successful when they 
are raised, see DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 378, at 1097 ("Data revealed that in only 
37.8% (56 out of 148) of the cases sampled unconscionability was found."); see also 
Giesel, supra note 378, at 463-65 (examining published state cases from 1996 
through 2003 and finding that in "only nine of the eighty-eight [duress] cases did the 
court decide the matter in favor of the duress claim," of those nine cases, an appellate 
court affirmed a lower court's finding of duress in only two cases); and (c) the 
difficulty in rebutting the presumption of contract validity in practice means that most 
cases will likely lose in court, see supra text accompanying notes 73-82 (discussing 
the difficulty of rebutting the presumption of contract validity). The defense-to-
performance doctrines include impracticability of performance and frustration of 
purpose. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261, 265 (1981). It is black 
letter contract law that changes in a market do not affect the basic assumption on 
which contracts are made. Consequently, the second element of both claims would 
fail and Mary Smith would be unable to establish a claim or defense based on either of 
these doctrines. Karl Wendt Farm Equip. Co. v. Int'! Harvester Co., 931 F.2d 1112, 
1117-18 (6th CiT. 1991) ("While the facts suggest that [International Harvester] 
suffered severely from the downturn in the farm equipment market, neither market 
shifts nor the financial inability of one of the parties changes the basic assumptions of 
the contract such that it may be excused under the doctrine of impracticability. "); In re 
F. Yeager Bridge & Culvert Co., 389 N.W.2d 99, 104 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) ("In 
Toebe's litigation with the state, Toebe's claim of impossibility was ostensibly 
grounded upon common law principles, under which mere changes in marketing 
conditions which render performance unprofitable do not justify releasing a party 
from its obligation to perform."); Milligan v. Haggerty, 295 N.W. 560, 563 (Mich. 
1941) ("Nor is there merit to defendants' claim that the lessee was released from 
performing his contract by reason of the fact that under subsequent market conditions 
it became unprofitable for him to manufacture bricks from the clay on the leased 
premises."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. b (1981). 
("The continuation of existing market conditions and of the financial situation of the 
parties are ordinarily not such assumptions, so that mere market shifts or fmancial 
inability do not usually effect discharge under the rule stated in this Section."). The 
same would be true for the doctrines of mistake. Pub. Uti!. Dist. No.1 v. Washington 
Pub. Power Supply Sys., 705 P.2d 1195, 1203 (Wash. 1985) (en banc) modified, 713 
P.2d 1109 (Wash. 1986) ("[S]hifts in market conditions or financial ability do not 
justify avoidance under the rules governing mistake."). 
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C. Smoke and Mirrors 
Power is ubiquitous; it exists eve~here.407 This is not an 
original conclusion. The Legal Realists,408 Critical Legal Studies,409 
feminism,41o and more "other-oriented" social justice theories such as 
Critical Race Theory411 and Queer Legal Theory412 exposed it. Thus, 
it is not at all surprising that power is also present in modem contract 
law. What is surprising is that the systemic and structural role state 
power plays in contract law is not acknowledged or discussed.413 
This omission is especially surprising given that the modem contract 
law system adopts the premise that contracts are made binding as a 
cardinal principal, continues to adhere to a framework that is 
constructed on assumptions that cannot be sustained,414 and 
institutionalizes unequal bargaining power.415 Constructing the 
system in this fashion comes with unacknowledged costs. 
Specifically, such a system not only reifies pre-existing distributions 
and power imbalances, but also exacerbates and ultimately obscures 
them to the ultimate detriment of parties with less bargaining power. 
Modem contract's formation rules and disclosure statutes play an 
important role in this obfuscatory process. 
To begin with, disclosure statutes presuppose that the main 
problem confronting contracting parties is bargaininfi inequality in 
the form of access to and possession of information.4 (j In so doing, 
407. Barnhizer, inequality, supra note 15, at 142 ("[P]ower is omnipresent in human 
relations---every actor has power of some kind and to some degree."). 
408. See supra Part II. A. 1-2. 
409. See supra note 239 (discussing "all law is politics"). 
410. See, e.g., SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley ed., Alfred A. 
Knopf trans. 1993) (1949); CATHARlNE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY 
OF THE STATE (1989). 
411. See, e.g., IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 
(1996); Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: 
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 
(1988); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L.REv. 1709 (1993). 
412. See, e.g., Francisco Valdez, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the 
Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law 
and Society, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1995). 
413. See Barnhizer, Inequality, supra note 15, at 141 ("American contract law rarely 
acknowledges power explicitly .... "). 
414. See supra Part II.A. 
415. See supra Part III.B. 
416. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 94, at 720 ("[M]andated disclosure is 
fundamentally misconceived because its solution to the problem of choice is 
information alone. But people's problems choosing go well beyond ignorance."); 
Willis, supra note 26, at 743 ("The disclosure regime admits of some boundedness to 
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disclosure statutes obscure other more problematic forms of 
bargaining inequality, forms that were clearly present in the 
CitiMortgage-Mary Smith hypothetical and in the subprime 
mortgage market in general, such as racial and gender bias.417 
As discussed earlier, use of disclosure statutes may also prevent 
many contracts from being successfully challenged based on several 
of the modem contract policing doctrines.418 By obscuring the 
existence of other contracting problems and rendering several of the 
contract policing doctrines ineffective, therefore, disclosure statutes 
help mask the power imbalance embedded in the modem contract law 
system.419 
Significantly, disclosure statutes also operate as a safety valve for 
the modem contract law system. They show that a problem has been 
identified (i.e., bargaining inequalities in the form of information 
asymmetries) and, more importantly, that something is being done to 
address it.420 That this something (i.e., disclosure statutes) does not 
work very effectively is generally ignored,421 and, quite frankly, is 
largely beside the point.422 The point is that something is being done. 
consumer rationality ... but concludes that the main correction the market needs is 
informational. "); supra text accompanying notes 111-14. 
417. See. e.g., Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender & Race Discrimination in Retail Car 
Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REv. 817, 817 (1991) (discussing race and gender bias in 
the retail car market); Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car 
Negotiations and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109, 109 (1995) 
(confirming the same findings of racial and gender bias in the retail car market); 
Hosea H. Harvey, Coercion or Choice in Conspicuous Markets: An Applied Analysis 
46 (gathering empirical research documenting racial bias in professional sports 
markets (e.g., the NBA» (on file with the author); supra notes 22-23 (citing studies 
finding that women of color were disproportionately sold subprime loans). 
418. See supra text accompanying notes 377-87. 
419. Cf Marotta-Wurgler, Disclosure, supra note 112, at 31 ("[A] policy concern ... is 
that the mere existence of disclosure regimes might lead courts to believe that market 
mechanisms indeed work, and thus to give insufficient attention to the potential for 
abusive terms."). 
420. In an analogous context, Hillman writes that "disclosure is cheap, substantiates the 
claim of consumer assent, and constitutes a symbolic victory for those advocating 
greater fairness in e-standard form contracting." Hillman, Boilerplate, supra note 
383, at 855. 
421. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 94, at 682-84 (explaining that there are few 
critics of mandatory disclosure); Willis, supra note 26, at 39 ("The optimism of some 
academics that a middle ground can be found for disclosures that neither under- nor 
over-deter risky but frequently socially desirable behavior is misplaced; the bimodal, 
poorly-calibrated behavioral response of most of the population to risk is well-
established, and no warning will change that.") (footnote omitted). 
422. Cf Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 94, at 682 ("[M]andated disclosure looks 
effective."). 
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Disclosure statutes, therefore, provide a visible but ineffective fix for 
very real contracting problems; in so doing, disclosure statutes 
diffuse the call or drive for alternative ways, like substantive 
regulation or maybe even market-based solutions,423 to address 
problems in contracting.424 The modem contract law system is 
therefore able to alleviate pressure on itself by providing a quick fix, 
which, in tum, enables the system as a whole to continue unexamined 
and unchecked.425 Hence, disclosure statutes create a very effective 
smoke screen for modem contract law. They justify the (ab)use of 
power by the party with superior bargaining power both by masking 
the power imbalance embedded in the very structure of modem 
contract law and diverting critical attention and analysis away from 
that structure as a whole. 
The end result is that the modem contract law system permits if 
not encourages the (mis)use of power by parties with more 
bargaining power, which, in tum, serves to reify and exacerbate pre-
existing distributions and power imbalances.426 A final look at the 
CitiMortgage-Mary Smith hypothetical will illustrate these last 
points. 
The (mis)use of power in the hypothetical is easy to spot-in a 
context that smacks of race and gender bias,427 CitiMortgage sold 
Mary Smith a loan with terms that unreasonably favored it and that 
modem contract law will likely enforce.428 CitiMortgage's superior 
bargaining power was thereby increased (even if incrementally) 
because it was able to extract more gains from its contract with Mary 
Smith than it otherwise would if it either had less bargaining power 
423. See Ben-Shahar, Myth, supra note 131, at 21-26 (suggesting rating of contracts and 
labeling as possible market mechanisms "to provide some degree of informed-ness"). 
424. See Hillman, Boilerplate, supra note 383, at 23 ("[O]isclosure . . . may 
inadvertently ... forestall other attempts at reform."); Ben-Shahar, Myth, supra note 
131, at 6 ("[T]he presumption of assent that accompanies pre-disclosed terms 
assuages the need to develop other protections."); Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra 
note 94, at 740 ("Mandated disclosure may not only undermine other protections, but 
also inhibit their development."); Marotta-Wurgler, Disclosure, supra note 112, at 6 
(,,[C]ourts might be led to mistakenly believe that sellers' terms are the product of 
well-functioning market mechanisms and be more lenient in policing abusive terms."). 
425. See supra text accompanying notes 282-84 (discussing the rational actor assumption 
and the use of disclosure statutes to re-Iegitimate that assumption). 
426. See generally supra Part lILA (discussing the synergism). 
427. See supra notes 22-23 (citing studies finding that women of color were 
disproportionately sold subprime loans). 
428. See generally supra notes 16-33 and accompanying text (discussing the 
CitiMortgage-Mary Smith hypothetical and binding contracts). 
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or was unable to capitalize on it. Its ability to (ab )use its superior 
bargaining power was then reified in its transaction with Mary Smith 
because the subprime mortgage loan would most likely be binding. 
Because the contract would likely be made binding, CitiMortgage is 
able to retain the benefits from its subprime loan with Mary Smith 
and all of its other subprime loans. Retention of the gains from its 
subprime loans means CitiMortgage ends up owning more resources 
(i.e., money in this example) over time, which, in tum, further 
increases CitiMortgage's unequal bargaining power.429 
Significantly, modem contract law, particularly its formation 
rules, legitimizes this (ab )use of power by CitiMortgage by providing 
a veneer of voluntariness. Because a contract is by the modem 
contract law system's understanding an act of free will (autonomy) 
one must "agree" to be bound. This notion of voluntariness is 
underscored by the existence of the disclosure statutes (TILA and 
RESPA) because Mary Smith (the party in need of the disclosures) 
has been given all the salient information necessary to make an 
informed decision about whether to enter into the loan contract with 
CitiMortgage. 
In fact, however, modem contract's formation rules and disclosure 
statutes work together to reinforce (and re-Iegitimate) the modem 
contract law assumptions that contracts are a product of voluntary 
and informed choice and obfuscate the (ab)use of power actually 
taking place. In so doing, modem contract law also reaffirms and re-
legitimates its assumption that unequal bargaining power exists but 
only in an unproblematic way.430 Because the existence, (ab)use and 
(mis)use of power within the system is obscured, the modem contract 
law system is largely successful in its re-Iegitimation effort. 
On the surface, therefore, modem contract law's framework 
appears intact-the system once again proves to be self-legitimating. 
That system, however, ends up diminishing freedom and liberty. 
This result should be deeply troubling for contract scholars and others 
who believe that freedom and individualism are best represented in 
the freedom of contract ideal. 
429. This is because the contract is likely to be made binding, which means it was validly 
fonned and is enforceable. It is important to note here that the scheme for this 
particular loan transaction is one in which the contract was regulated (TILA and 
RESP A) in a way that is supposed to help protect the consumer. Imagine if this was 
in an area with no consumer protection regulation. 
430. See supra text accompanying notes 91-101. 
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CONCLUSION 
We could certainly pretend things are different in the world of 
contracts. Pretending would actually be quite easy because all we 
would have to do is continue to subscribe to the current 
understanding of modem contract law. Or we could just continue to 
claim that the modem contract law system is efficient or serves 
individual autonomy well. Of course, to do any of these things, we 
would have to ignore that all of the assumptions underlying the 
modem contract law system are deeply flawed in theory and practice. 
We would also have to ignore the practical implications, if not actual, 
adverse consequences, that modem contract law imposes on 
contracting parties, especially those with less bargaining power. 
The alternative is to be honest and acknowledge that modem 
contract law is premised on power, and, therefore, it is not neutral 
and does not produce neutral results, notwithstanding the perpetual 
myth that the law should be and do just that. 431 If we adopted this 
understanding, we could then acknowledge that contracts are made 
binding as an exercise of state power and that, as a direct result, 
unequal bargaining power becomes a systemic and structural 
component of the system. We would then be able to stop pretending, 
for example, that contracts are voluntary, informed, and a product of 
rational actor decision-making. 
Under this alternative view of modern contract law, most contracts 
could and probably would still be binding. But we could, at the very 
least, discuss the normative questions about the role of power in the 
contract law system-should it be constrained, and if so, how? If 
there is agreement that power in contracting should be constrained, 
we could then contemplate rules that grapple with power per se rather 
431. Samuel J. Astorino, The Transformation Thesis of Morton 1. Honvitz: Research 
Problems and Implications for the Practice of Liberal Democracy, 36 DUQ. L. REv. 1, 
6 (1997) ("Law is neutral, therefore, and nonpolitical, because legal reasoning does 
not, and should not, react to external social forces."); Susan S. Kuo, Culture Clash: 
Teaching Cultural Defenses in the Criminal Law Classroom, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
1297, 1298 (2004) ("By legally parsing facts, they learn to siphon off the emotional 
and cultural content-both in the stories themselves and in their reactions to the 
stories. The language of the law commands that they do this because of the enduring 
belief that the law is neutral and impartial.") (footnote omitted); Adele M. Morrison, 
Queering Domestic Violence to "Straighten Out" Criminal Law: What Might Happen 
When Queer Theory and Practice Meet Criminal Law's Conventional Responses to 
Domestic Violence, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 81, 103 (2003) ("This idea 
that the law is neutral, unbiased and equally applied regardless of status or identity 
permeates the legal system."). 
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than continue to wrestle with legal fictions. For example, we could 
seriously consider the viability of a veil of ignorance analysis to 
determine fair terms.432 We could consider constructing and adopting 
a bargaining power analysis. 433 We could contemplate new 
interpretations of existing contract doctrines, like good faith,434 or 
think about reviving the late Professor Richard Speidel's proposal to 
constrain the use of standard forms involving non-merchants in a 
sale-of-goods transaction.435 Or, more radically, we could consider, 
as some have suggested, getting rid of mutual assent entirely.436 
Obviously, adopting any such rules would require a rigorous 
normative analysis that incorporates more than a mere assessment of 
their costs and benefits.437 Such an analysis is outside the scope of 
this particular article. Moreover, it is also clear that any solution 
proposed would be subject to the very critiques this article has 
leveled at the modern contract law system.438 That the solutions are 
imperfect and subject to critique, however, should not and does not 
prevent their consideration or adoption. We live in an imperfect 
world in which the uneven distribution of power is a fact of life. We 
nevertheless have to move forward in a way that is "consistent with 
minimum standards for social and economic relationships in a free 
and democratic society.,,439 Perhaps contract law has a role to play in 
432. See Singer, Standards, supra note 142, at 142 (suggesting a veil of ignorance 
analysis). 
433. See Bamhizer, inequality, supra note 15, at 223-34 (suggesting a bargaining power 
analysis); Miller, supra note 54, at 531-35 (suggesting a sophisticated party analysis). 
434. Houh, supra note 107 (advocating for use by courts of the doctrine of good faith as a 
device to eliminate racial subordination); Amy J. Schmitz, Confronting ADR 
Agreements' ContractlNo Contract Conundrum With Good Faith, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 
55 (2006) (advocating for the use of the doctrine of good faith to fill in gaps in ADR 
agreements). 
435. See Richard E. Speidel, Revising VCC Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52 
HASTINGS L. J. 607, 615 (2001) (suggesting revisions to UCC §§ 2-206, 2-207 such 
that "the presence of a standard form or term signaled the risk of unfair surprise," 
which therefore required the party using the standard form or term to get the other 
party's express agreement or risk having the terms excluded from the contract). 
436. See Omri Ben-Shahar, Contracts Without Consent: Exploring A New Basis for 
Contractual Liability, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1829 (2004) (suggesting that a no-retraction 
principle replace the doctrine of mutual assent). 
437. Joseph W. Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REv. 899 (2009) 
[hereinafter Singer, Normative] (discussing normative argumentation and how 
lawyers can defend claims of equality and justice). 
438. See Bamhizer, Bargaining Power, supra note 94, at 147 (2007) ("Because power is 
so complex and so dynamic ... bargaining power subdoctrines will always be subject 
to criticism of in coherency and indeterminacy."); supra Parts II-III. 
439. Singer, Normative, supra note 437, at 899. 
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this discussion. By acknowledging the existence, role, and 
consequences of power in the modern contract law system, therefore, 
we at least free ourselves to debate all of these issues and solutions 
frankly. 
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